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Directed by: Professor David Glassberg

This dissertation traces the history of Springfield

Hospital from 1890 to 1980.

Springfield Hospital as

a

I

examine the case of

springboard to examine the larger

developments in the U.S. healthcare system in the twentieth
century. Medical historians have done yeoman work in

charting the story of hospitals to 1920 in terms of case
studies: In this work,

I

try to take hospital history up to

the present. Medical historians have also constructed

powerful interpretative frameworks of national hospital

development in the twentieth century.

I

build on their work

and in some cases take issue with their analysis based on

my examination of Springfield Hospital.

Among my findings: Spingfield's medical staff records
reveal real ambivalence among physicians about the

development of the medical center model of healthcare. The
records show as well a concurrent fight among physicians
over competing definitions of professionalism. Trustee and

Superintendent records suggest that the numbers of those
iv

unable to pay for healthcare was perhaps higher than has
been commonly believed. Furthermore, Springfield's case

indicates that private hospitals (and not just the largest

urban teaching hospitals usually surveyed in hospital
histories) did provide for large numbers of such

individuals and did not simply try to hive them off to

public facilities. Moreover, the cost and complications of
caring for the medically needy substantially shaped

Springfield's priorities and finances. This exacerbated

tensions among the medical staff over the development of
Springfield into a medical center. Most importantly, the

problems associated with caring for the indigent made
impossible effective realistic long-term planning. At
Springfield, this helped cause the decline of the medical

center model of health care and laid the basis for the

dominance of local Health Maintenance Organizations.
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION
In this dissertation, I explore the history of

Springfield Hospital from 1890 to 1980.

research this history,

I

In preparing to

found it paradoxical that while

hospitals have been a central factor in the nation's
economy, culture and politics, there are virtually no

academic case studies of individual private hospitals.

Leading medical historians such as Paul Starr, Charles
Rosenberg, and Rosemary Stevens have written overviews of

apparent national developments and other historians have

assumed that their analysis is accurate and holds true for
the local level as well.

A local history, then, might

provide minor variations and interesting details to what
are otherwise incontrovertible narratives. These narratives

have as their center the unfolding of such grand themes as
the rise of professionalism among physicians and the growth
of the medical center model of health care.

In general,

such narratives suggest that the development of America's

current health care system was basically uncontested and
largely preordained by the prevailing medical culture.

They are largely based on extensive research into the
records of the American Medical Association, the American

Hospital Association, and other affiliated organizations,
and documents from select major hospitals in the largest

urban areas.
1

There are two fundamental problems
with the standard
approach to twentieth century hospital
history.
The
interpretation assumes that what happened in
the most
advanced sector of health care simply filtered
down or was
otherwise replicated down below. The second
more important
problem is that these accounts assume that the
rhetoric of
the various interest groups contained in their
papers

accurately reflected and represented local realities
and
perceptions.

I

find instead that standard narratives miss

crucial aspects of the development of hospitals and

misstate the role and beliefs of central participantsparticular ly physicians.

These histories tend to

overemphasize the coherence and unity of physicians, miss

physician's ambivalence about much of the evolution of
medicine, neglect physician's difficult experience with

government at the city and state level, and discount
physician's objections about government involvement in
health care as either paranoia, greed, or rank
disinformation.
In my study,

I

try to show some complexities that

traditional accounts miss and in so doing attempt to
fashion a somwehat different view of hospital history in
the twentieth century.

In the first chapter, I begin with

a quick overview of the state of medicine and health care

in the 19th century.

I

then discuss important changes in

medicine, and in the medical profession and link these
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changes with the rise of hospitals at
the beginning of the
twentieth century. Next, I focus on
Springfield Hospital's
early decades to 1920. The standard
literature argues that
hospitals in order to get increased revenues
turned from

charitable operations to profit-making
enterprises,
in so
doing, they reduced services to lower class
patients either
by diverting them to public hospitals or
else by charging
new fees and that the result of all this was to
make
private hospitals solid financially. I find to the

contrary that, at least in Springfield Hospital's case,
despite its increasing reliance on paying patients,

Springfield continued to face major financial problems

throughout this period precisely because charity care
continued to occupy a large portion of patient admissions.
Moreover, the problem of providing for charity care made it

difficult for Springfield Hospital to expand or to even
think in terms of long-term planning.

I

suggest that this

sort of pattern would be a recurring dynamic throughout

Springfield's history.
In my second chapter,

I

begin with a survey of

medicine and hospitals circa 1920.

I

discuss the enviable

public image and position enjoyed by physicians.

I

then

show how physicians were actually less exalted from 1920 to
194 0 than commonly believed or rendered in most standard

accounts.

A central point here is that in important

respects, in outlook, training, and practice, the medical

3

profession was hardly a tight corporate
body; that few
professional organizations opposed the state

of affairs,

that those who did so were unsuccessful in
their efforts to
win over the rest, in the chapter, I illustrate
the

truncated professionalism then current at Springfield
Hospital as shown in the areas of education, patient
records, cooperation among physicians, and community
service.

I

argue that financial problems of the period

caused in large part by the expense of caring for charity

patients prevented Springfield from expanding patient
services or even to offer proper patient care— further

reenforcing physician's prevailing brand of
professionalism.
In the third chapter focusing on the years from 1940

to 1960,

I

begin by recounting the amazing growth of

Springfield Hospital's operations

— much

of which was due to

the increased numbers of patients with health insurance.

I

describe the advantages and limitations of health insurance
for both providers and patients.

I

link the growth in

patient revenues and admissions to the decision by some
Springfield physicians and administrators to make
Springfield more like its sister institutions in Boston and
New York.

The remainder of the chapter addresses the

battle royale that followed, a contest hardly mentioned in

existing literature, over new definitions and new demands
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of professionalism and the degree
to which Springfield

would be restructed accordingly.
In my fourth chapter,

to 1975.

I

survey Springfield from i960

Not till the mid 60s,

I

argue, did a medical

center model of health care— as opposed to a
community
hospital approach— take hold at Springfield.
Furthermore,
even at that point, Springfield remained rent by

dissatisfaction with the new regime, which was exacerbated
by the latter 's inability to provide an ample supply
of new

services and programs of high quality to physicians.

As

earlier, the cost and space devoted to caring for the

indigent derailed Springfield's development.

Springfield

also faced damaging competition from its cross town

neighbor

— Wesson

Memorial Hospital

— which

enjoyed a more

balanced mix of primary care and acute care services.

I

then discuss the efforts of health care planners and local

businessmen to rationalize the area's health care services.
Their efforts culminated with Springfield's merger with

Wesson in 1975.
through 1980.

I

then briefly examine the merger's impact

In the conclusion that follows,

I

summarize

Springfield's history and discuss its relevence to current

hospital historiography and contemporary debates about
HMO's and health care reform.

5

CHAPTER

2

SPRINGFIELD HOSPITAL TO 192 0

Until the end of the l9th century, few
Springfield
residents would be caught dead in a hospital.
They shared
this conviction with Americans in general.
The accepted
wisdom was that if you wanted to stay healthy or
overcome
illness, it was best to stay away from hospitals.

Hospitals emerged after the Civil War to take care
of
the sick poor. Until mid-century, those unfortunates
in

Springfield and elsewhere without visible family support
who fell ill were carted off to almshouses and dumped there

together with the rest of

a

pathetic mass: the mad, the

blind, the crippled, the chronically arthritic.

The

almshouse was generally last stop for the sick poor and

hardly anyone noticed or cared about their passing.
Profound economic and demographic changes spurred the

widespread development of hospitals.

The surge of industry

helped draw millions from abroad (and many thousands of
others from American rural areas) to cities where they
labored under unhealthy and often deadly conditions for

pitiable wages.
tenements.

They crammed into noisome, unventilated

They subsisted on substandard diets, drank

dirty water and impure milk.

They lived in the midst of

raw sewage, horse droppings, and the carcasses of spent or

slaughtered animals.

They breathed soot from untreated

burning coal and inhaled the poisonous vapors pouring from

industrial plants.

The number of impoverished urban
folk

who fell ill, or who were injured,
who were unable to
adequately care for themselves, and had
no one to properly
look after them grew enormously.
[i]

Almshouses were overwhelmed by the hordes of
sick or
broken persons who streamed through their
doors.
The
plight of almshouses and those who beseeched
them for
assistance caught the attention of individuals and
groups
from many quarters. These included social
reformers,
politicians, businessmen, labor officials, philanthropists,
and leaders of numerous ethnic and religious orders
and

societies.

In city after city, they set about building

hospitals to care for the needy.

[2]

Support for hospitals came from various motives,
ranging from the paternalism of the wealthy and fortunate
to those in hapless circumstances, to the desire of elites

and ordinary citzens to demonstrate political leadership
and civic virtue.

Rarely though were hospitals intended to

house its benefactors.

These shelters for the helpless

were for "them."
Besides, given the limitations of medical care, there

was virtually nothing that could be done at most hospitals

that wasn't available at a decently appointed home.

Rest,

good food, warmth, ventilation were the major tonic for
illness.

Also important was attentive nursing by loving

family members who relied on potions and procedures derived
from almanacs, medical dictionaries and remedies handed
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down from generation to generation.

Mainly though, nature

was left to work its wonder,
whether horrific or
beneficent. Hospitals were largely
irrelevant in
determining the outcome. [3]

Home care was favored over hospital
care because
hospitals were notorious for their
untrained staff who gave
desultory care.
in such places, oftentimes, if typhus
didn't get you (as a medical patient) than
gangrene would
(as a surgical admission).
Hospitals were notorious
for

being dingy and dirty.

They were known as pesthouses (not

only those that quarantined patients) not only
because of
the contemptuous attitude of some to the "inmates"
as they
were known then but because conditions were often
vile with
all types of vermin crawling through the darkened
corridors

and shabbby wards.

For the luckless patients, it was a

terrible humiliation, for their relatives-if they had any
in the vicinity- a stain on the family that a member would

be consigned to such surroundings.

[4]

Aside from the grubby setting and miserable treatment
by so-called nurses, there was another reason to favor home
care over hospital confinement; this was to avoid dealing

with the physicians who roamed the premises.

Americans

— whatever

their economic status

Most

— rightly

disdained physicians whose skills and training were usually
barely adequate or atrocious. They either completed

apprenticeship before being turned loose on

a

a

brief

not-wary-

enough public, completed a half-baked program at one of the
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numerous propietary schools, or avoided
the inconvenience
of attending lectures altogether
by going the

correspondence school route.

[5]

Physician licensing was as unregulated at the
time as
medical education. As a result, the U.S. had
more

physicians per capita than any major country in
Europe.
Nearly anyone could set himself up as a practitioner
though
few had much scientific knowledge of the causes
or

treatment of illness and disease.

In fact, as James

Cassedy has remarked, "doctors if they were lucky knew just
a little

more than most patients they practiced on."

Practiced indeed!

[6]

Partly because the field was so overcrowded, few

physicians in the 19th century were able to make a decent
living-much less today's handsome salaries- just by

practicing medicine.

Physicians resorted to barracuda-like

behavior including patient stealing to try to "make their
nut." This did not endear them to the public.

Physicians

were further discredited by the open warfare then current
between the various sects of medicine, each claiming the
one and true approach to practicing medicine. Hydropaths

pushed the "water cure;" Christian Scientists swore by the
restorative power of "mental healing;" Thomsonians claimed
that roots and herbs properly used were the principal

weapon against illness; Homeopaths insisted that the
application of minute amounts of otherwise toxic

medications to ill individuals would work wonders. Of
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course, none of the sects had anything but a vague

understanding of the bases of illnesses.

[7]

To call medicine a respectable profession would have

invited derision from most Americans.

Today's image of

physicians as caring professionals would be
incomprehensible to any 19th century American familiar with
physicians' harsh therapies, including bleeding, purging,
and blistering.

The sick were sensible to pass these by,

to try a herbal remedy, to seek out a midwife, a mortician,
a family

member or a friend for help, or simply wait and

pray that their particular affliction would pass.
most non-medical treatments were relatively benign.

At least
If

they did no good, they caused no further harm unlike those
of so many physicians of the day.

[8]

Given the marginality of both hospitals and
physicians, it is not surprising that Springfield had been

incorporated as

a

city for more than 25 years before the

idea of building a general hospital for the sick was even

considered.

Also, the city's attention and resources in

the seventies and eighties, as true throughout the country,

were fixed on the grave and dramatic public health problems
of the day- notably matters of proper garbage disposal and

creation of a workable sewer and water system.

Even after

Springfield Hospital was incorporated in 1883, raising

money was an inordinately slow and cumbersome process.

In

to
the first five years, not enough support was forthcoming

even produce

a

plan for the proposed hospital. [9]
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Boosters, though, did not abandon
their idea for a
hospital. They made appeals through
the city's municipal
register for support. They also
appealed to clergy who
organized "hospital Sundays" at local
churches to raise
funds.
A few wealthy individuals offered
sizable

donations but only in return for special
treatment at the
future facility. Perhaps they feared
contamination from

run-of-the-mill patients or they feared neglect by
the
regular staff. Whatever the case, the Board of
the still
non-existent institution tactfully declined the offer,
"While the board is of the opinion that special
arangements
can be made with the hospital to accommodate the
proper

demands of special services at the proper time... at present
it seems inexpedient at this time to receive any but

unconditional subscriptions except as to time and manner of
payment." Though records are sketchy, there does seem to
have been a plan to build a hospital specifically for

private patients, but members determined that there was not
enough interest from prospective well-to-do patients to
justify a separate building.

However, Board members did

choose to establish a special section of private rooms.

With that decision, gifts from affluent citizens increased
significantly.

Most notable of these was Dorcas Chapin, a

long time resident and scion of one of Springfield's

leading families.

She gave twenty-five thousand dollars to

Springfield hospital on condition that its corporators
raise a matching amount.

It took them a year to do so.
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construction on the hospital finally began in
1888 and it
opened in 1889.
[lO]
Popular attitudes toward the hospital were explained
in a newspaper article in 1889 shortly after its
opening,

"In most minds the hospital is associated with paupers
and

criminals and what are termed the unfortunate
classes.

.

.Even to visit such a place is distasteful to most

people and the sick hesitate to come there." [ll]
Forty years later, a veteran physician recalled that
at the turn of the century most viewed Springfield hospital
as "an institution having little advantage over a jail

except for the matter of its being easier to depart from
and not always by the back door." The public's misgivings

and suspicions of the hospital were warranted.

Springfield

hospital was a hazardous oftentimes deadly place and not
for patients alone.

Through the 1890s, the casualties many

times included hospital personnel.

There came to be a

stock phrase used in such bleak moments: Nurse Smith or

Physician Jones was stricken "in the midst of [his/her]
usefulness." Nurses were particularly vulnerable.

Through

the decade many were forced to resign because of ill
health; this might account for the large number of those

students- about one third- who quit during their first
year.

[12]

What was the patient profile that first decade? Given
that native-born Americans of means preferred home care,
the patients at Springfield hospital who filled the wards
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tended to be impoverished immigrants,
more of them men than
women, more likely to be single than
married, and young
rather than old. The hospital divided
its patient load
depending on whether the patient was a
medical or surgical
case.
On the medical side, the main ailments
were
infectious diseases reflecting the recurring
epidemics of
malaria, tuberculosis, typhoid, and influenza
in the
period.
These composed the majority of patient admissions.
On the surgical side, many cases involved persons
who had
been crushed or otherwise mangled generally about
their
limbs including ankles, arms, feet, hands, and legs.

Industrial accidents reached epidemic proportions in late
19th century America.

Springfield's prominence as a

manufacturing and transportation center ensured that these
sort of injuries accounted for a large number of patient

admissions in the 90s.

[13]

Injuries received while working for one of the

railroads that criss-crossed the area were especialy
common.

Railroads at the time were notoriously unsafe

workplaces.

Injuries among railroad workers increased

nationally from twenty thousand in 1880 to seventy thousand
at the turn of the century.

In 1900 alone,

four percent of

railroad workers were hurt on the job and one of every four

hundred killed.

In Springfield, not only rail workers but

also area machinists and mill hands were vulnerable to

industrial accidents.

If they were lucky, the casualties

received appropriate sutures or had their fractures set.
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In more serious cases, amputations
whether of fingers,

hands, arms, toes, and legs, were the rule.

serious accidents, nothing could be done.

In the most

There was simply

recorded the notation "death from shock of injury."
When
the hospital's death rate increased in 1892, it was

attributed to a sharp rise in "hopeless injuries." in fact,
the death rate hovered at over ten percent for much of the
decade, and the medical staff eager to draw new patients

took pains to explain that the gloomy figure was no

reflection on the quality of care at the hospital.

Rather,

the figure simply indicated that most of those admitted

suffered from either fatal injuries or incurable diseases.
[14]

In the 1890 's, Springfield offered little in the way
of specialized or complex medical services.

Like most

other hospitals its strong suit was simply the possibility
of rest, shelter, and food for the indigent sick.

Springfield's skeletal administration offered little else
to patients.

Its non-medical personnel consisted of a

superintendent, steward, and matron.

They were responsible

for hiring and firing staff, obtaining supplies, keeping

the institution in proper order and cleanliness, and

overseeing the half dozen nurses and handful of other
workers.

Physicians

on staff typically volunteered for

one to three month stints, providing service to the

community and occasionally snagging paying patients then or

hopefully later either through gratitude or good word (for
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data on Springfield's budget and
numbers of patients and
personnel, see table in appendix).
the early nineties,
there were four physicians and four
surgeons who shared the
duties yearly.
[15}

m

Given all the limitations of health care
at
Springfield hospital in those early years,

it is not

surprising that public support at the outset
was modest, at
best.

In 1890, hospital administrators put on
a brave

front, noting that the "sympathy of the public
continues"

for the hospital and went on to refer to various
gifts

received.

But the report later explained that the matron

had been sacked.

Though the hospital staff was minuscule

and received little more than room and board, the costs
of

employment were

deemed excessive.

Not only that, there

were not enough patients to warrant her duties.

It was

decided to wait until patient numbers improved before

hiring another matron and in the meantime to include her
tasks in the steward's responsibilities.

[16]

Hiring decisions also reflected the ambivalence of
doctors about their involvement in the fledging enterprise.
The 1893 medical staff report explained that the hospital

would soon have to recruit

a

full-time physician to oversee

patient admissions and treatment.

Why?

While the

volunteer staff of physicians had been "faithfully
attending their onerous duties," in the near future that

would no longer be possible.

The reason given was that as

patient numbers increased, physicians faced
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a

growing

conflict between their hospital duties and other
responsibilities.

This may have been so, but other factors

were surely at work here.

Granted, patient numbers were

increasing, but not much.

The hospital remained relatively

small (less than seventy patients at any one time) through
the decade.

And certainly, there were scores of physicians

in the city who might have been called upon to plump up the

volunteer corp.

Another explanation for this request is

that most patients were primarily indigent and offered no

renumeration to the physicians.

Moreover, volunteering to

treat such persons did not generally help boost

physician's status among the affluent.

a

It is likely for

these reasons that volunteers remained few and those that
did help out were hesitant to enlarge their hospital

responsibilities

— thus

the need for a full-timer.

For the first decade, the

[17]

hospital primarily catered

to the poor, with less than ten percent of patients paying

full freight.

It was a charity operation with all the

unpleasant connotations: substandard quarters, dependency,
and

often the anonymous impending

inhabitants.

demise of the

From the beginning the hospital faced the

problem of how to pay the expenses incurred by its
predominately indigent patient population.

Initially,

agreed to take all patients sent to it by the city.
this quickly became an excessive burden.

it

But

Within the first

year, trustee members fixed on the pattern that they would

continue for half

a century.

While private charity would
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continue, government funds-most
ly from the city- would
supplement these.
[18]
In 1890, Formal contracts were drawn
up with city

officials from Springfield and surrounding
towns.

The

Hospital agreed to take the sick poor and in
return receive
annual appropriations. This relationship
continued through
the nineties.
By then, the hospital was receiving more
than five thousand

dollars annually for this purpose.

At

the turn of the century, patients under the guardianship
of

the state overseer for the poor were also routinely

receiving care at the hospital.

In the teens,

new group-

a

-patients covered by the state workmen's compensation
board

— were

added to the list.

The hospital was generally

willing to take those with limited or no resources and
cooperated with the state for this purpose.

[19]

Pointed appeals for donations show that existing state
support was insufficient to keep Springfield Hospital
afloat.

In the first decade,

Springfield could survive.
period,

it was uncertain whether

In a statement typical of the

in the 1892 annual report, the President remarked

that while "no organized appeals have been made recently,
it will be necesssary to do so at once... and with

earnestness, if the hospital is to continue to do good and

efficient work."

Were his comments then and similar

statements made through the decade by other trustees

a

matter of crying wolf, of exaggerating the hospital's
difficulties simply to whip up public support?

17

Trustee

records indicate genuine anxiety in this period
that the
Board might be forced to refuse patients, curtail

programs,

and cancel building expansion because of insufficient

public backing.

[20]

Springfield could not generate sufficient resources to

substantially improve its facilities.

The hospital grew

only in fits and starts with no possibility of overall
planning.
matters.

This was the case even in the most basic

An adequate heating system and laundry, for

example, were not complete till 1893.

When the hospital

opened, surgical and ward patients shared the same ward.

The President of the medical staff made repeated appeals to
the public for funds to create a separate wing for surgical
cases.

As he explained, noting the hazards involved in

continuing the existing arrangement, "the mixing of
patients sick with fevers with those who are injured or who
have open wounds is obviously a great disadvantage to us."

Despite his entreaties, monies were not forthcoming and for
five more years, the two units remained joined.

Also,

in

the nineties, physicians pressed trustees to build a new

surgical unit.

Senior staff members explained that the

existing facility was too small, ill-equipped, and
unhygenic, "in view of advancements in surgical technique

during the past few years, the time seems to have come to
provide Springfield hospital with

a

building adequate and

equipped as to meet requirements of asceptic surgery of
today."

The Board approved the proposal in 1893 but three
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years later the project remained incomplete.

In the early

years of the new century, the Board agreed to another

expansion project, this time to build an additional wing
for a new ward and to refurbish another.

not finished for ten years.

This project was

[21]

Funding the hospital was

a

constant scramble.

from patients never matched operating expenses.

were an unreliable source of income.

Income

Donations

The bulk of

Springfield's operating funds were initially provided by
philanthropists, well-heeled city boosters, and some of the

more enlightened members of the city's business and

professional elite.

New Board members were chosen in hopes

of procuring hefty donations from them while alive, and

hopefully

bequests when they departed.

Income from patients, the affluent, and government

agencies was supplemented by occasional rummage sales, and

contributions of items ranging from flowers to furniture to
food.

Fundraising benefits were also critical in

sustaining Springfield during its first decade of
existence.

Lavishly appointed charity balls brought

together business leaders, debutantes, society swells, and

politicians from near and far.

They flocked to hear

entertainment provided by the likes of John Phillip Sousa
or the Philadelphia Philharmonic.

[22]

Hospital leaders tried various devices to raise

additional funds.

Trustee members and senior medical staff

formed a fundraising committee, streamlined hospital

19

operations, hired a collector to dun deadbeats,
decided to
charge non-Springfield residents higher rates,
debated

whether to close the

nursing school in 1897, and even

refused admission to some patients after the city

temporarily dropped its subsidy due to budget problems in
1899.

However, none of these measures proved effectual in

cobbling together a reliable financial base for the
institution.

The revenue derived from the few paying

patients was not enough to offset the costs of care

rendered to the rest at reduced prices or gratis.

[23]

A New Century
In 1899, on the tenth anniversary of the hospital's

opening, the president recounted that in the early years

the hospital "was a feeble institution.
existence.

..

..

struggling for its

in a period when the purpose and value of the

hospital was not fully understood or appreciated."
However, he was confident that Springfield Hospital was

rapidly becoming an accepted and vital part of the
community.

His comments were not the crowing and wishful

thinking of a hospital supporter.

A number of factors at

the turn of the century and later caused the public in

Springfield and much of the country to rally around

physicians and hospitals [24].
The American Medical Association's role was key in

increasing the competence and authority and public regard
for physicians.

Founded in 1846, by 1900 the AMA finally

gathered the membership, the resources, and the will to
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become the nation's principal gatekeeper of
medicine. The
AMA worked to clean its own house in the early
twentieth
century by helping tighten physician licensing laws,
increasing regulations over legitimate medical schools,
forcing out the fly-by-night facilities, and fashioning
rules for the upkeep and inspection of hospitals,

it

supported laws against unethical conduct by physicians,
including physician advertising.

Moreover, it supported

school health inspections and the passage of the Food and

Drug Act. [25]
The AMA's Council On Medical Education worked with the

Association Of American Medical Colleges and later the
Carnegie and Rockefeller foundations to institute

a

rigorous standardized curriculum for medical schools.

This

was sorely needed at a time when less than ten percent of

physicians graduated from recognized medical schools and
twenty percent had never attended medical school lectures.
They introduced a research component and internships into

medical school programs, and generally helped ensure that
students graduated with genuine technical and diagnostic
skills.

[26]

Until then, the rule of thumb for most

medical schools was that if you had the cash, they had a
spot for you.

No longer.

Now, rigorous exams determined

acceptance or rejection, and acceptance into school no
longer guaranteed graduation.

Students now had to pay

close attention to their courses.

more demanding.

Final exams became much

No longer could students at Harvard and
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elsewhere pass their finals by simply
responding to
questions in a brief oral exam.

a few

[27]

Earlier graduates were mostly
jack-of-all-trades and
masters of none. This rapidly changed.
Increased

attention to basic science and research
in medical schools
led to advances in physiology, anatomy,
pathology, and

bacteriology.

This was a crucial factor in the development

of the specialties.

Surgery was the outstanding example

but they also included pediatrics, obstetrics,
opthomology,
orthopedics, and urology.
[28]
Physicians, whatever their specialty, also enjoyed
new

accuracy

in diagnosis and treatment thanks to new
chemical

procedures to test blood, stool, and tissue samples.
Moreover, advances in pathology enabled physicians to
chart

more closely the genesis and progression of disease.

[29]

The benefits of scientific medicine extended to public
health.

Regulation of the milk and water supply reduced

mortality rates.

These years also saw a test for

syphillis, a diptheria anti-toxin, and vaccines for tetnus

and typhoid.
lives.

All of these, very visibly, helped save

They also helped raise physicians' standing and

that of the medical establishment in general.

[30]

One of the major factors at Springfield Hospital that

helped boost public support for both physicians and
hospitals were improved surgical techniques.
Board's president explained, in years past,

In 1901, the

"many useless

and harmful operations have been done" but now "good
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results are becoming more and more the rule.

Operations

rare and almost unthought of ten years ago are common now."
[31]

Major surgery in the hospital had been limited to only
the most dire of circumstances.

Even in most cases of head

or abdominal injuries, physicians usually let nature take
its course rather than open body cavities except when

"outside forces like a horse or buggy or street car had

already started the job." [32]
Until the turn of the century, surgery was restricted
in part because of the pain it caused (and the death from

shock that often followed)

.

When surgery was unavoidable,

doctors used hypnosis and alchohol or opium to try to

distract the patient, but this was not always successful.
It was difficult to get the job done when the poor fellow

was screeching and struggling.

Some surgeons also believed

that pain was part of the healing process, that it was best
to leave out painkillers altogether; patients were

admonished to simply ignore or put up with the torture.
Few were able to do so.

For these reasons, both physicians

and patients had long limited surgical procedures to minor
fractures, superficial wounds, and ulcers.

But the

development and rapid refinement of anesthesia made more
complex operations possible and tolerable.

[33]

Another factor behind Springfield's Hospital's
increasing number of surgical procedures was that

physicians there as elsewhere were learning how to prevent
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post-operative infection.

Post-operative surgery death

rates hovered around twenty-five
percent till the turn of
the century. And dealth rates
were significantly higher in
hospitals than in private residences
because conditions
were not sanitary in most hospitals.
This began to change
by the turn of the century. Physicians
and nursing staff
at Springfield Hospital and nationally
learned how to
practice sterile procedures from textbooks,
post-graduate
training, and on the job instruction. As
John Duffy and
others have written, medical personnel learned
the

importance of washing their hands before touching
patients
and of wearing rubber gloves while conducting
operations.

They learned to properly clean instruments instead
of just
smearing blood and other less vital fluids on their gowns
before going back in for another try and to sanitize

instruments that fell on the floor instead of simply

continuing to use them.

Physicians stopped the practice of

moistening suture threads with saliva.

Nurses learned to

dress bandages to keep them clean instead of using dirty
ones over and over again.

[34]

With these changes surgery became more successful and
safer.

More patients were now willing to go under the

knife, and physicians were more confident that patients

would survive operations and recover.

Surgery, especially

of the abdominal and pelvic region, became a routine

procedure.

Appendectomies (practically unknown in 1890)

and gynecological operations became commonplace.
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Formerly,

those with peritonitus (inflammation
or infection of the
abdominal cavity) were "condemned
to death" because
physicians were unable to operate on
them; now such
operations could go forward and patients
more often than
not would recover. As a result,
the annual number
of

abdominal operations doubled at century's
end from twentyeight to sixty while the death rate
which had been
seventeen percent when Springfield Hospital
first opened
fell to just eight percent.
[35]
As was true of hospitals elsewhere, in these
years
public perception of Springfield Hospital began
to shift

from a place evoking dread and fear to one inspiring
hope
and confidence.

As one newspaper editorial explained in

1908 "The wonderful cures wrought by the skill of the

surgeon and the trained nurse are the miracles of the 20th

century

Many people think of the hospital as the place

where pain is caused.

I

wish it were possible to estimate

the amount of pain that is cured

Springfield is a

veritable temple of healing." [36]
By 1900, patients were much more willing to enter

Springfield Hospital and put themselves under the care of
its physicians.

Individuals were no longer stigmatized for

entering a hospital.

Family members could now rest easy

knowing that their kin were getting professional care
there.

As a result of improved and expanded treatment,

more affluent patients gained genuine confidence in

hospital care.

The way was now clear to admit more paying
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patients, an appparent solution
to the hospital's chronic
financial travails.

Springfield Hospital like many other
institutions
turned to private patients and
patient fees to keep itself
afloat.
Patient fees, by World War One, would
account for
more than half of hospital revenues.
Already,
by the end
of the century, there were a few
private rooms for well-todo patients. A few years later,
semi-private rooms were
built with sliding scale fees that the
middle class could
afford and thereby get treatment while avoiding
association

with persons in general wards.

Board members tried to

encourage area physicians to treat more private
patients in
the hospital and formed a joint committee with
physicians
for advice on how to make the hospital a more welcome
place
for private patients.

Records were also kept of the total

number of patients admitted by each physician per month,

detailing the proportion of paying versus charity patients

with an eye to motivate physicians to try to improve the
ratio.

[37]

By all accounts, the decision to aggressively court

private patients paid off handsomely at the outset.
Springfield Hospital doubled its income from 1902 to 1904
from nineteen thousand to thirty-five thousand dollars.

With the infusion of these monies, the hospital increased
its number of beds from sixty to one hundred and purchased

much needed equipment.

Perhaps most impressive was the

increase in patient admissions.
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As the President noted in

1909

"the custom of using our hospital
has materially
increased in the past five years,
1902 these jumped
fifteen percent over the previous
year, the largest
increase in its history." During the
following year, 1903,

m

patient admissions increased forty
percent to 773.
1901 to 1908 patient admissions tripled
from

From

465 to 1,337.

Income from patients now represented

about two-thirds of

total revenues, twice the proportion of
the 1890s.
Testifying to both physicians' willingness to
do invasive
surgery and patients' increasing acceptance of
the
procedure, about two-thirds of patient admissions
were now
surgical cases, also twice as many as in the early
days of
the facility.

By 1912, there were three times as many

patients admitted for surgical cases as for medical ones,
outstripping even national trends.
as well.

male.

The gender mix changed

In the 90 's, patients admitted were predominately

But by the teens, women were the majority.

In the

occupation list of patients, the largest category was now
housewives, who were coming in increasing numbers for
childbirth.

Their growing trust in hospital care is

reflected also in the rising numbers of operations of
tonsilectomies on their children.

[38]

To get more paying patients, Springfield

administrators made special arrangements to make certain
hospital beds private.

Like other hospitals nationally,

Springfield contracted with numerous professional and
business organizations in the years before World War One to
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pay to have their members
specially provided for in the
hospital. A 'free' bed was set
aside for members of a
local Church in return for a
large contribution from one of
the parishoners. A manufacturing
concern gave several

hundred dollars a year to set aside
bed service for its
employees. A prominent citizen from
Chicopee gave five
thousand dollars for a free bed for
town residents in need
of treatment.
New England Telephone bought a bed for
five

years to cover the care of its employees.

[39]

Reorienting the patient pool towards paying
patients
seemingly represented a fundamental shift at
Springfield
Hospital.
Some hospital leaders, while supporting
the

decision, also expressed a certain ambivalence
about the

new policy.

They feared that care would become two class,

the poor would be neglected, and some might be shut
out

altogether.

[40]

It cannot be denied that charity work henceforth

occupied

a

decidely less central place in the

considerations of hospital personnel and in the day-to-day
operations of the institution.

The decision to reorient

the institution to the care of private patients was

certainly hard-nosed. But was it hardhearted?
It is true that the patient mix changed.

Private

patients quickly dominated the admission pool, surging from
less than ten percent in the 1890s to more than two thirds

ten years later.

It is also true that increasing numbers

of private and semi-private patients elbowed aside poorer
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patients to some extent.

The records indicate extreme

crowding in the wards during the following decade,
including at one point three times the desired number
in
the children's wards.
Some of the poor may have been

refused admittance altogether.

It is also true that

accommodations in the general wards were not upgraded as
needed because many of the available discretionary funds
were sunk in facilities for more solvent patients.

One

glaring example: In 1910 there were still not separate
sections for surgical and medical cases in the open wards.
[41]

On the other hand, the increased revenues from private

patients made possible a general expansion of the facility
allowing for more charity patients.

The equation was

simple: without private patients, the increased numbers of

public patients could not have been covered.

Granted,

private patients enjoyed creature comforts and personal
care not available for ward patients.

But, overall, care

was far better for both private and public patients than
ever before, and many more poor treated.

private patients was not the act of
but an appropriate shift

a

The move to

souless corporation

given the paucity of public

funding for the facility.
To relieve crowding at the hospital, and the crowding
of more affluent patients by

working class persons, in

1911 hospital officials explored the possibility of

organizing a dispensary.

In 1913, Hospital officials voted
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to help fund a

district nurse who arranged for
patients to
convalesce at home and to visit them
there as needed.
By
1914, these visits totalled more then
two thousand yearly.
[42]

Still the poor came to the hospital
and were not
turned away. To its credit, Springfield
Hospital took them
in, if it did not actively encourage
them.
In these
years,

it was not unusual for less than
twenty-five percent of

patients to pay the full cost of care and forty
percent to
pay half or less. The hospital tried to
establish more
semi-private rooms but there were not enough of
these to
offset losses elsewhere; in any case, even the
patient fees

frequently did not completely cover the costs of care.

Regular contributions were not enough to make up the
difference; neither were state subsidies.

[43]

For a few years following the turn towards private

patients, the crush of patients and infusion of cash was

enough to comfortably fund the hospital.

However, the

windfall from the new crop of patients lasted less than a
decade.

Springfield soon found itself in somewhat

straitened circumstances.

authorities for help.

It turned once again to public

Squabbles arose between the hospital

and local and state officials over appropriate renumeration
and reasonable length of stay for charity patients.

And

periodically, in times of mounting debts, trustees sold off
real estate holdings, stocks, and other assets to generate
capital.

[44]
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In 1914, the Hospital managed to raise
sufficient

funds to erect a new wing with more patient
rooms.

The

addition had been part of a more comprehensive
plan for
seven new buildings first unveiled in 1910. The
rest of
the plan was never implemented.
Instead, for several years
following, Hospital officials frantically tried to somehow

increase the number of regular subscribers (contributors)
to the hospital to simply get through each year and to

defray the mounting debt which by 1917 topped one hundred
fifty thousand dollars.

[45]

Conclusion
The problems hospital administrators, physicians, and

trustees faced from 1890 to 1920 would remain the pattern

throughout Springfield's history.

Improvements in

technology and services resulted in increased numbers of
patients treated but also additional costs of expansion,
materials, physical plant, supplies, equipment, and
personnel.

Moreover, covering the cost of treatment of the

poor would remain a special problem.

Unlike some hospitals

in other cities, Springfield did not have a public hospital

to siphon off the indigent sick.

There was no public

versus private hospital split in Springfield largely
because there was no significant public hospital to speak
of.

Was Springfield the exception or the rule here?

If

Springfield's experience was more representative of typical
communities in the country, than the financial well being
of the nation's hospitals was considerably weaker than
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historians have generally indicated.

The burden of the

cost of treatment of the poor was
a central factor for such
hospitals.
Increased numbers of private patients
never
translated into sufficient patient fees
to match the
increased costs. Sooner or later hospital
operations
deteriorated marked by overcrowding and an
inability to

afford needed renovations.

By the

1920s— the moment of the

city's greatest prosperity— exactly this sort
of scenario
would unfold.
[46]
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CHAPTER

3

SPRINGFIELD HOSPITAL 1920-1940

Something momentous happened in American health
care
by about 1920.

Thanks to continued improvements in

standards of training, diagnosis, and treatment, an ailing

person who consulted

a

doctor stood better than a fifty-

fifty chance of benefiting from the encounter.

Many

Americans who less than a generation earlier would have
disparaged doctors as quacks now glorified them as saviors.
Thanks to the joint efforts of public health workers and
doctors, the country had nearly wiped out infectious

diseases.
and adults

Compared to decades past, when so many

— succumbed

— children

to an early and sudden death,

Americans felt almost invulnerable.

Moreover, with several

diseases now regarded as potentially curable, ailments like
colds or sore throats that patients previously had ignored

now became a concern of patients and doctors alike.

[1]

In novels and films, the press and pulpit, doctors

were praised as selfless and devoted healers, who stamped
out disease and invented remedies for diabetes, vitamin

deficiencies, and hormone abnormalities.

The grateful

nation rewarded them with high incomes and unprecedented
influence-notably among civic groups, legislators, and
businessmen.

[2]

Hospitals, of course, benefited from improvements in

health care, from doctors' lofty status, from Americans'
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heightened attention to their physical well being.

For one

thing, hospitals no longer had to advertise for
customers.
In fact,

following cure or recuperation, patients

occasionally lingered in hospital premises which were said
to combine the conveniences of well-appointed homes with

the amenities of luxury hotels.

Also, the nation's

foundations showered hospitals and affiliated medical
schools with 150 million dollars for the latest and

greatest research projects, in stark contrast to the time

when they had given just thousands and that grudgingly;

medicine became the best funded of philanthropic causes.

[3]

At the pinnacle of the hospital establishment were
doctors, deans, and administrators at major medical schools

and the largest teaching hospitals in Cambridge, Baltimore,

New York, Philadelphia, and elsewhere.

Brimming with

fungible capital, scientific knowledge, highly skilled
personnel, and up-to-date technology, the achievements,
rules, and methods, of these institutions were expected to

spread to hospitals everywhere.

Hospital superintendents,

medical staff, local medical societies, national

professional organizations, and governmental agencies would
all eagerly implement the healthcare visionaries' plans.

Ultimately, medical leaders predicted, healthcare would be

socialized like major utilities, and the public's health

managed by government as thoroughly as public safety.
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[4]

Certain that America would adopt social welfare
policies similar to those found in the advanced
countries
of Europe, Many medical leaders regarded the
development of
a coordinated universal health care system as
both

inevitable and imminent.

It was neither.

could only develop if physicians

Such a system

joined together en masse,

embraced the idea, and assumed a leading role in its
creation.

That did not happen.

Despite the hosannas given

physicians and medicine being the queen of the professions,
their regal position was not altogether deserved and was
not universally accepted.

Physicians could not be

innovators when their medical education promoted an insular

view of medical practice, so long as physicians adhered to

narrow parochial interests, and important health services
remained sparsely distributed.

[

5]

Physicians were thought to possess exemplary and

demonstrable expertise.

Yet,

improvements in educational

program standards the previous twenty years had, in some
respects, been surprisingly modest.

Most medical students

had a high school education plus some college courses.

They did not need more in the way of background, because
most medical school courses included very little basic
science or clinical work, and required little analysis of

medical or scientific problems.

Furthermore, students used

textbooks that (unbeknownst to them) recommended treatments
that were often ineffective or even harmful.
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Finally,

.

after completing their coursework, students
served hospital
clerkships that oftentimes lacked supervision
or any
genuine training. [6]

Following graduation, about one quarter of the newly
minted M.D.s took licensing exams. Few states required
such exams (Massachusetts was a notable exception)
However, those who chose to take and pass exams hoped to

reassure prospective patients of their competence; perhaps
it was best for all concerned that patients were unaware

that the exams usually were multiple choice and tested

knowledge of lists and definitions recapitulated from
medical school courses.

[7]

A small minority of medical school graduates went on

to internships and residencies.

These post-graduate

programs were not much better then medical school
clerkships: few hospitals even had formal relationships

with medical schools, much less well organized programs.
Interns and residents invariably filled the lowest priority

staffing needs in hospitals; attending physicians cared
little about providing advanced education and training to

recent graduates.

It was more convenient to assign the

drudge work to the newcomers.
The popular image of physicians as specialists who

combined research with patient care was based on the
acomplishments of those practicing at elite urban teaching
hospitals.

However, most physicians in this period, as
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before, were full-time general practitioners
who worked in
small general hospitals.
Full-time board certified

specialists comprised less than one-third of all
physicians
even by 1940. others called themselves "specialists"
but

they often had no substantive training, or they were
"partial specialists," moonlighting general practitioners,

who had skipped their residencies and who had not taken or

passed the specialty exams.

It was easy for them to begin

lucrative and prestigious practices (specialists often made

three times the income of general practitioners)

.[ 8

Acceptable standards for medical education and

practice remained lax because the profession was not nearly
as united as its leaders claimed, or as the public was led

to believe.

Americans believed that specialists were the

apex of the profession; specialists regarded themselves as
the most influential of doctors.

laymen were mistaken.

Both specialists and

Specialists were

small minority of

a

the profession, and their opinions were outweighed by those
of general practitioners in all but the

largest cities

partly because specialists themselves were

a

highly

disparate lot.
The profession's cardinal principle was that each

physician should freely determine the scope of his own
practice.

That freedom intensified the perpetual search

for patients, and diverted physicians from considering more

expansive notions of health care.
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Without agreed upon

standards among practitioners,
fierce competition was more
common than comity or cooperation.
Specialists vied with
generalists; sub-specialties-more
than a dozen of themsquared off against one another;
rivalries were
particularly intense between pediatricians
and

obstetricians and gynecologists, between
psychiatrists and
neurolgists, and between surgeons and
internists.
Each of
the subspecialties had separate certifying
boards which
were really professional clubs whose major
priority was to
stake out turf and prestige— insuring that
specialists were

expert practitioners was not always their
highest priority.
Instead of policing themselves, they condoned
incompetent
physicians; building social networks was their primary
goal.

Virtually anyone claiming to be a specialist could

get a specialty board to vouch for them.

[9]

Instead of working in tandem, medical factions debated
one another in medical societies, in schools, and in

hospitals.

With no agreed upon overarching national

standards, standards were established arbitrarily by

whomever held the most power at any given moment in a
hospital, medical school, or medical society. [10]

Hospitals formed their own national accrediting
organization, but its standards were only attained by large

urban hospitals dominated by specialists and which employed
a paid staff that generally had close ties to area medical

schools.

Aside from this tiny minority, most physicians
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and administrators routinely flouted
accreditation

recommendations.

Where hospital inspections occurred and

guidelines for improvement provided, they were
not likely
to be implemented. When penalties were
assessed, they were
too mild to have an impact on hospital affairs.
When

accrediting agencies condemned inept or indifferent
physicians, administrators fiddled and diddled because
they
needed the physician's business. Furthermore,
physicians

often had admitting privileges at several hospitals.

Hospitals that physicians judged as unfairly restrictive
quickly lost business to their neighbors down the street.
Hospitals' survival depended on pleasing physicians with

dubious medical expertise and questionable ideas of

professional service

— regarding

who was fit to perform

operations, who was qualified for appointments to the
staff, how to maintain case records and conduct

postmortems, and so on. [11]
Physicians' business practices and intramural

catfights were not usually privy to laymen.
that John Doe rarely saw a physician.

One reason was

Most Americans

continued to rely on a priest, family member, or friend for
medical advice.

For medications, Americans turned to

itinerant salesmen or local grocers and probably spent more
for patent medicines than for physician consultations .[ 12

One reason why the sick rarely consulted phsycians was

that few could easily afford health care.
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had a difficult time paying
their medical bills. This
is
Why the majority of Americans
saw a physician less than
once a year.
For the working classes,
disaster was apt to
strike those who fell ill and
went without medical care;
sickness was the leading cause of
destitution.
in the
largest cities, where free care was
most readily available,
one quarter of the population
relied on clinics and other
outpatient services .[ 13

Aside from cost, another reason patients
rarely saw
doctors was that the latter 's actions
belied their popular
image.

in diagnosis they were prone to say
the obvious and

not provide much in the way of solutions.

The miracles

promised by x-ray machines and tb tests did not
come to
pass; in many instances these and other
instruments

produced faulty or ambiguous information, or produced
accurate findings that were then misinterpreted by
doctors.
Furthermore, doctors could do little to treat cancer,

tuberculosis, mental illness, or chronic ailments (the
latter, then as now, was the fastest growing patient pool);

doctors avoided these fields, and focused their attention
on those areas

— like

surgery

— that

offered more favorable

outcomes for both doctor and patient. [14]
Doctors may have appeared to be prosperous but not

every doctor had a lucrative practice.

While city

physicians in the 1920s usually made from $8,000 to $12,000
yearly, overall, average yearly earnings were less than
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half that aniount.

Specialists made much more than

generalists.

And whatever their locale or
field, few
doctors did well financially in
their early years of
practice.

Doctors opposed anything that might
undermine their
independence or threaten their economic
stake.
Most were
adamant that the government should keep
its mitts out of
medical practice and therefore fought
state aid to veterans
and the chronically ill, to child welfare
and venereal

disease clinics, or to cancer research.

Doctors who

deviated from the party line were ostracized
by their
colleagues, were drummed out of local and state
medical
societies, denied referrals from other doctors
and
admitting privileges at many hospitals .[ 15
One reason why doctors so vehemently opposed state

involvement in health care was that many doctors—

especially general practitioners—felt more embattled than
exalted in the twenties.

Ironically, while the public

image of physicians had improved, the actual practice of

medicine had in certain ways become more difficult.

All

the hullabaloo about the glories of scientific medicine

seemed to undermine those practicing the art of medicine.

Researchers and specialists got the lion's share of public

attention and adulation.

General practitioners were

treated as the dinosaurs of the profession, doomed for

extinction once the medical and social planners had their

way, even though general
practitioners comprised the
inajority of physicians and saw
the vast inajority of

patients.

Many of them felt squeezed by
outside
institutions, including representatives
of accreditation
agencies, medical schools, foundations,
government
agencies, and at times by some of
their own

organizations. [16]

Medical Care And HPalth Care Tn T h e Citv Of

In the twenties,
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large numbers of city residents and

individuals from surrounding towns streamed to
Springfield

Hospital— many for the first time

in their lives.

More

people of all classes made use of Springfield's
facilities
In fact,

its growth rate was double that of the city's

population.

Operations alone jumped more than 100%; non-

surgical admissions rose even faster, and lab exams and xrays, which previously were so infrequent that they were

left unrecorded, now totalled many hundreds yearly. [17]

Already by the early twenties, Springfield Hospital

reached its maximum capacity.

Patient care soon

deteriorated in severely overcrowded wards.

To absorb the

overflow, patients were shipped off to three make-shift

units in adjacent houses.

Occasionally, it proved too

difficult to provide even basic amenities, and patients
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were turned away; .any
others faced long delays
in
treatment. [18]
Through the twenties, the
refrain came from the
superintendent and medical staff:
All facilities are being
utilized to the utmost, renovation
and expansion of the
institution must begin as soon
as possible.
This was not
hyperbole. Constant crowding,
overwork, and use of
antiquated equipment strained
Springfield's
staff.

Springfield needed larger facilities
to meet the crush of
new patients but was hardpressed
just to meet its ongoing
expenses.
Finding the funds quickly to construct
a new
building was impossible-the building
was not completed for
a decade. [19]
Difficulty in collecting patient fees was

Springfield's major financial problem.

Prevailing economic

industrial conditions largely determined
patient income.
Free work and late payments were inevitable
and unavoidable
aspects of doing business. Springfield was
severely

handicapped by these circumstances; it could never
budget
for major expenses, or plan for the future.
[20]

The matter of erratic payment illustrates another fact

about patients in the twenties;

a

majority of them were

from working-class or lower middle-class backgrounds.

Many

were the first in their families to seek out and receive
hospital care and came to Springfield in much larger
numbers than ever before.

In the mid-twenties,

free in-

patient care comprised between ten
and twenty percent of
the total number of patients
treated, and another ten to
twenty percent were city or state
subsidized.
[21]

Where the care and comfort of paying
patients was
concerned, Springfield's Superintendent,
John Gardiner, was
especially attentive. He issued memos
to physicians
reminding them to make sure that foreign
objects not be
left behind in patients after operations
or examinations.
Concerning indigent patients he was less
solicitous,

expressing alarm, for example, at the increasing
numbers of
free beds and the burdensome expenditures
stretching
into

the thousands of dollars to pay for them.

His alarm was

understandable, since such expenditures amounted to

a

significant portion of the hospital's yearly deficit—
sometimes reaching one-half of the total. [22]

Established in 1925, the outpatient department was the

main provider of care for the working and lower middle
classes.

Within a few years of its 1925 opening, the

department handled a caseload of more than ten thousand
patients a year.

To help the department run smoothly, a

social worker-Mrs. Jeanne Dixon-was hired.

She had two

major responsibilities; her first was to provide nonmedical services to patients that would help in their

treatment and recovery.

She purchased braces, located

nursing homes for the growing numbers of chronically ill
elderly, comforted patients whose attending physicians
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Changed every month or so,
and referred patients
and family
members to various agencies,
as appropriate.
Mrs.
Dixon's
other responsibility was
to be the gatekeeper
for the

hospital in terms of patient
admissions and payments.
do this she investigated
each potential patient's
employment and financial status.

To

Mrs.

Dixon had to serve the patient's
needs and also
serve the hospital's interests
in terms of controlling
operating costs and crowding,
it was an awkward position.
Hospital administrators and doctors
insisted that she get
patients in and out as rapidly as
possible, and, above all,
that she bar solvent patients from
free services.
Trying
to mesh two very different goals
in the service of two very
different constituencies was a source
of ongoing tension
between Mrs. Dixon and hospital officials;
and the tension
was illustrated in her monthly reports.
[23]
Mrs.

Dixon's reports offer the first detailed
glimpse

of patients at Springfield Hospital.

They reveal something

of the entry of large numbers of working-class
patients

into the hospital.

The reports also indicate something

else: Mrs. Dixon was intent on persuading
administrators,

physicians, and trustees that indigent working-class

patients deserved healthcare— even for non-emergencies.
[24
Mrs.

Dixon reported that her clients, due to poverty,

had rarely if ever received medical treatment.
the first time they were getting help.

Now,

for

One early case

involved a fe.ale factory worker
who had had a draining
abscess of tubercular origin
for several years which
had
deformed her leg and made it
excruciating for her to stand
while at work. Another case
concerned a girl of fifteen
Who was brought in complaining
of breathing problems and a
goiter.
She had been kept at home since
infancy because
her parents believed her to be an
invalid.
The physician
discovered no serious medical problems,
and concluded that
the girl be sent to school and
get regular exercise.
[25]

One case may have been the most
telling of all. a
sick young girl was brought to the
hospital.
Several weeks
later, after her condition had apparently
improved, one of
the nurses noticed that no one had visited
her.
The social
worker investigated and discovered that the
parents had
abandoned their daughter and left town. It was
a callous
act, to be sure.

And it was certainly shocking.

However,

it is quite possible that the parents felt
unable to care

for her themselves, that by abandoning her, private

agencies would come forward to do a better job, that her
access to healthcare would be greater as an orphan than as
a

member of

a

destitute family. [26]

Dixon's stories were designed to reassure Springfield
staff skeptical of the worth of the outpatient department
and dismissive of Dixon's contributions.

Some felt, with

good reason, that the department was a financial drain,
that Springfield could ill afford.
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Hospital administrators

and medical staff could never be
certain that the social
worker-or the outpatient department

itself-actually

reduced inpatient care for the indigent.
Mrs.

Dixon also was suspected of aiding the

undeserving by providing care gratis
for persons who could
easily afford to pay. she periodically
tried to
reassure

physicians, administrators, and trustees on
this point,
explaining that all prospective patients were
thoroughly
vetted in full view of the rest to determine
whether they
merited special financial consideration based
on the

"patients social and financial status and previous
medical
treatment." She determined that fewer than five percent
of

outpatients were actually able to pay for private medical
care, that very few patients ever tried to abuse the

service

— and

none succeeded.

In the summer of 1927, she

reported the case of one such freeloader; a middle-aged
single man,

a laborer,

undisclosed ailment.
be given free care.

who was treated at the clinic for an

Having no savings, he asked that he
The social worker sternly chastised

him for his desultory spending habits.
had learned his lesson.

He assured her he

From then on, he vowed, he would

set aside part of his meager wages in case something

similar ever happened again. [27]
Through her reports, Mrs.

Dixon tried to demonstrate

the usefulness of her work and the genuinely worthy state
of her charges.

She was not terribly successful in her
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Springfield's outpatient department,
like
clinics elsewhere, clearly ranked
low among hospital
priorities as evidenced by its abysmal
funding and general
neglect by physicians and administrators,
on the other
hand, however much Springfield
officials may have recoiled
at the expansion of outpatient
services, they did not
exclude indigent and lower class patients
from medical
care.
Charity at Springfield in the twenties
was more
extensive and more costly for the hospital
than ever
before. [28]

Volunteers helped Mrs. Dixon sustain outpatient
services.

But there were never enough volunteers and so

clinics were severely crowded and understaffed;
when
volunteers' committment flagged, the already

limited programs ceased.

woefully

Occasionally, volunteers

suggested that programs be expanded or new ones be
established.

However, their proposals were rarely taken

seriously or ever implemented by Springfield's
hierarchy. [29]

Hospital volunteers were part of

individuals

— many

a loose

network of

of them middle and upper-class women

involved in numerous social welfare projects in groups like
the Family Welfare Association, the Visiting Nurses
Association, the Junior League, the Women's Club, and the

Community Chest.

At a time when government was generally

uninvolved in such matters, when the vast majority of
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residents had no health care provisions in jobs, when the

majority of children six years or younger had never had

a

physical exam, they alerted Springfield officials and
ordinary citizens about pressing health care needs and

encouraged increased public and private support for health
services. [30]

The Visiting Nurse Association, typical of other

charitable organizations, provided care for mothers and
children, the elderly and incapicitated.

The VNA cared for

thousands of residents, and of those only a minority were
immigrants or the impoverished; only one-third received

totally free care; only one-third were born outside the
U.S. [31]

Due to anemic support from both the city and from

private donations, the VNA's budget was always bare-boned.

With an inadequate budget, it could never hire enough
nurses and could only pay them a pittance.

Due to the low

salaries and enormous work loads, the VNA could only

recruit inexperienced and sometimes incompetent student
nurses, or marginal graduate nurses who tended to be

disloyal and irresponsible. [32]
In addition to already trying circumstances faced by

the VNA, the organization faced charges of patient poaching

from physicians.

Physicians worked with VNA nurses but

only reluctantly and insisted on two conditions for their
cooperation: visiting nurses could see patients only
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following a medical referral.

Yet, most of these patients

couldn't afford physician fees;
just one quarter of
patients contacted a physician prior
to seeing the VNA
nurse.
Physicians also insisted that VNA
nurses restrict
themselves to educational work. in
practice, of course,
since patients were unlikely to get
medical help otherwise,
this demand was also ignored by nurses
and patients.
Finally, Visiting Nurses were supposed
to be working

primarily on a charitable basis.

The problem was that if

nurses treated too many for free, physicians
attacked them
for harboring chiselers; if they charged too
many too much,
they were attacked as competitors. The VNA, like
other

non-hospital based health care providers, skirmished
with

physicians over competing responsibilities.

The VNA was

victorious to the extent that it provided care for twenty

percent of Springfield's residents.

Yet, their work never

received commensurate city or private support. [33]
Through the twenties, overwhelmed by public demand for
their services, the VNA and similar groups regularly

implored city officials to assume greater responsibilities
for the costs of clinics and for the visiting nursing care.

They wanted adequate health care to be

a

true community

responsibility, and not contingent on the good deeds of
volunteers, philanthropists, and overworked staff.
However, the prevailing view among the city's elite was

that private charity was intrinsically more responsive than
54

]

government, was a more profound
demonstration of duty to
one's neighbors, that increased
government aid would
actually harm health care services by making
them

bureaucratic and unprofessional .[ 34
Despite the lack of adequate public support for
community healthcare, graduate nurses in the VNA
valiantly
tried to meet working class healthcare needs. At

Springfield Hospital, student nurses worked as the major

patient care providers— especially to charity patients.

Nursing was the best many young women could hope for, aside
from being a clerk, a salesgirl, or a secretary, at

a

time

when women were mostly excluded from the professions. [35]
Nursing 'professionalism' was different than that of

male-dominated fields like medicine and law; nurses were
expected to be utterly subservient to physicians, to master
rituals of deference such as standing when physicians
entered a room or giving up their seats to physicians.
They learned to be attentive to physicians' every motion,
mood, or instruction, to refrain from ever making important

decisions about patient care, to labor without reward or
relief and with little hope of education or occupational
advancement.

The prof essionalization of nursing was

thereby delayed for decades; instead Springfield nurses
simply aped existing women's roles in which nurses

recapitulated behaviors of wives, daughters, and
servants. [36]
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Springfield relied on student nurses to accommodate
the growing number of patients while saving
money
and

evading laws restricting the hours of licensed
nurses.
However, the supply of competent student nurses
never kept
up with the demand.

Springfield Hospital couldn't recruit

or retain an adequate nursing corps because nurses
suffered

gross exploition. [37]
Little had changed since 1893 when Springfield

Hospital Nurse Training School first opened.
beginning,

From the

'instructors' emphasized practical training on

the wards with little time devoted to lectures or lab
instruction.

Nurses were expected to be mulish and

obliging to all demands.

Such behavior was viewed as

emblematic of womanly values of the time and notions of
"separate spheres."

Ideal candidates had had extensive

experience either as mothers helpers or as servants .[ 38
Nurses were expected to sacrifice their own health, if
need be, to the needs of patients.

That they agreed to do

so was evident by their presence in large numbers as

patients (unlike physicians)

— at

general ward patients and

major hospital expense.

a

times comprising half of
Ill

health forced many nurses to take lengthy leaves of
absence; the dropout rate sometimes totalled thirty

percent; dismayed by so many of their classmates falling
ill and forced to leave school, student nurses could only

wait and wonder how long they would remain healthy. [39]
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Even if nursing had not
been an exhausting,
thankless
and dangerous job, it
would have been difficult
for

administrators to recruit student
nurses.
Recruitment was
doubly difficult because
the job offered little in
the way
Of professional rewards.
Pay, for example was
generally
significantly less than for
teachers or for social

workers.

As a result, it was nearly
impossible to draw what it
viewed as "more desirable"
students.
Springfield officials
hoped that its candidates would
be from the "better sort,"
refined young women with "diction
and the right style,"
those with more education (a
significant proportion of
students in the twenties lacked a
high school diploma) who
could presumably better minister to
the needs of the middle
classes flocking to the hospitals.
In hopes of reaching
this better sort, hospital recruiters
made regular
presentations at area high schools. To woo
the most
promising young women, recruiters also
staged elaborate
receptions at the new nurse's residence to show
off the
victrola, and grand carpets gracing the living
room-

downstairs from the rather modest student quarters.
[40]

None of these measures succeeded in bringing the

desired types of students to Springfield Hospital.
Conditions were too difficult and wages too low to get or

keep such "respectable" young women.

Instead,

it was the

ill educated and the unpolished who composed the core of
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the student staff.

This proved a constant tug of war

between the nursing superintendent and
students regarding
the proper comportment, disposition,
and behavior of
nursing students.

Nursing Superintendent Blanche Blackman was
a welleducated and capable professional. Deeply
respected by her
peers, she later served as president of the
state nursing
association.
Unfortunately, she couldn't help her students
become comparable professionals; Blackman's job was
to

break her students, to turn them into pliable laborers.

Blackman rigidly controlled student nurses from

morning to night.

At breakfast, she commanded students to

remain at their tables until she nodded her head and
excused the group.
prayers.

Following breakfast, she led mandatory

Then before going off to their duties, she

measured their uniforms; for reasons of style and comfort
(and mild mischief making) some students occasionally

surreptitiously

shortened their skirts.

Blackman

inspected every student to ensure their uniforms were not

more than ten inches from the floor.
While all students had to observe strict protocols on

virtually every aspect of their personal and working lives,
first year students were especially singled out.

probationers after all, the term connoting both

They were
a

sentence

and the uncertainty that they must have felt about their
position.

Blackman regularly punished students for a
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variety of infractions, suspending many
and
others.
Her records are filled with notes

expelling
like

A

student was sent away for disobedience." "it was
necessary
to allow four students to go home until such
time as their
hair which they had bobbed had grown again." Students
were

dropped from the rolls for being "unsatisfactory material."
In May of 1923, for example, one student was dismissed

because of what was referred to as "a prolonged but

thoroughly concealed disobedience" of the prohibition on
fraternizing with male staff members.

She hinted that the

accused had associated with someone below her class (or

would-be class), and possibly that she had become pregnant.
Blackman's ruling in all such matters was final, and

usually not very elaborate.

More typical was the case of a

student who was dropped from the rolls in March 1926

because "she lacked the qualities that we deemed to be
desirable" or the student in the spring of 1929 whose

resignation was requested.

No explanation was offered or

needed. [41]

Student nurses' experience was similar to that of

other Springfield medical personnel

— notably

interns.

In

some large urban hospitals interns were regarded as

ambitious upstarts who threatened the preeminence and

perogatives of senior staff.

Not at Springfield;

interns

were treated as indentured servants more than fearsome
young rivals.
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As with student nurses, the principal
appeal of
interns was that they provided cheap labor.
Although
internships were supposed to provide instruction
and hands
on experience, interns' day-to-day
assignments involved

mostly the scut work of taking histories,
conducting exams
and performing lab tests for senior staff.
Such
duties

were typically learned in a matter of hours or days
but
were then done for months to spare senior staff the

chores

Aside from serving senior staff, interns served the
general ward and the outpatient department.

As with

student nurses, interns subsidized Springfield's care of
the lower classes while allowing senior physicians time to

attend to more affluent patients and to cultivate

referrals [42
.

Interns were ill equipped to handle the constant

stream of outpatients.
little experience.
care.

They had too little time and too

They complained of offering haphazard

They decried the separate and unequal treatment

accorded inpatient and outpatient divisions, in which
inpatient services got the lion's share of attention and
resources, and urged that senior staff and administrators

take action.

Their pleas went unheeded.

The division

between outpatient and inpatient care would last for
decades. [43

Deplorable conditions in the outpatient department

were the result of interns' crushing responsibilities
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combined with the almost total absence of guidance by
senior staff.

Senior staff demanded much from interns yet

made little effort to teach them in return.

Few ever took

the time to discuss cases with interns or to point out

important facts and findings. [44
Some staff members coaxed their fellows to involve

interns more in their regular rounds.

One urged "that

private and semi-private patients be made more use of as

teaching material" to benefit the interns.

Others

suggested that staff members systematically monitor the
interns' performance "...that after interns have cases

worked up, visiting men review their work for approval or
constructive criticism." No formal action was taken.

And

Superintendent Walker usually steered clear of matters
Senior staff continued to

related to interns' training.

neglect systematic instruction of interns. [45]
Walker's reluctance to challenge senior staff

regarding teaching responsibilities was just one indication
that the real power at Springfield rested with the senior
staff.

Senior staff were generally Springfield's most

skilled and experienced physicians; the ones who held major
appointments, who had full privileges in matters of patient

admissions and treatment, who determined Springfield's
policies, who commanded the attention of trustees, and

dominated everyone below them. [46]
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comprising less than thirty
percent of Springfield's
physicians, senior staff were
predominantly white male
native born Protestants, many of
them from old yankee
families of long residence in
Springfield.
Many hailed
from the finest medical schools
of Boston and New
York;

many won wide recognition including
the presidency of the
local medical society, the presidency
of the state hospital
association, the presidency of the New
England Surgical
Society, and the presidency of the
national radiology
society. [47]
Staff meetings were held at the tony Colony
Club—one
of the gathering spots for the city's
social elite.
Though
the meetings were convivial occasions they
were not solely

social events.

Typically after dinner and a brief report

from the medical staff president, special presentations

followed usually consisting of general talks on subjects
like the thyroid gland, gall bladder disease, or the

treatment of diabetes with insulin, along with perplexing
cases that physicians wanted to share and discuss with

their colleagues. [48]

Patient deaths were rarely discussed.

Reading of the

"casualty" list was perfunctory and invariably the

assembled unanimously ruled that deaths were caused by the

primary disease with no discussion of how to handle such
cases in the future.

Occasionally the superintendent

dissented and remarked that faulty sterilization of
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instruments or other unnamed (or
unrecorded) mishaps had
caused a particular casualty.
After his comment, the
meeting continued as usual.
Without an ongoing monitoring
committee, physicians couldn't be
closely supervised; there
was no means of directing
physicians in standard ways;

sanctions could not be imposed on
physicians for mistakesassuming mistakes were ever discovered.
[49]

In 1928, a few senior staff members
tried to institute

monthly group meetings to discuss what were
referred to as
"poor results" including wrong diagnosis,
preventable
deaths, and infections.
They couched this proposal in
terms of collegial learning and teaching but it
caused
considerable resentment even though attendance and

participation was voluntary.

The proposal was not

implemented for more than twenty years. [50]
Superintendents Gardiner and Walker were more
insistent that senior staff maintain proper records.

Apparently there were growing problems with routine patient
record keeping in the twenties.

Patient charts lacked

vital information; surgical notes included conflicting
statements; interns' accounts of patients' progress clashed

with those of attending staff; physicians failed to file
patient progess reports, to take notes at admittance or
discharge, to take histories or exams before operations,

and were vague about what was done during operations.
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In

general, one quarter to one
half of patient records were
incomplete at any given time.
[51]
On several occasions, the
Superintendent implored the
staff to be more careful. He
flattered them when they
temporarly made modest improvements
and threatened them
with disciplinary action when
they returned to their usual
habits.
Nothing he did made a difference.

What was happening here? Possibly,
physicians were
becoming less vigilant about record-keeping.
the
twenties and thirties a flood of new
patients meant a
staggering amount of additional record keeping
(especially
for city and state agencies for reimbursement
purposes)

m

which took time away from patient care.

Some physicians

let the paperwork slip rather than patient
care.

Moreover,

agencies such as the American Medical Association,
the

American College of Surgeons, the American Hospital
Association, also insisted on more exact standards for

medical care.

All of which necessitated more elaborate

record keeping and tighter control over patient records.
Physicians were told to hold frequent staff
conferences, to meet periodically to review and analyze

hospital work, to be vigilant about attendance at staff
meetings, and to produce thorough minutes of staff

meetings.

Such information was needed so that accrediting

organizations could examine and evaluate hospital
standards.

Accreditation was said to be crucial if
64

Springfield was to continue to draw
medical students,
physicians, nurses, patients, and
support generally from
the community.
Despite the stated importance of staff
attendance at
meetings, physicians' attendance
records were dismal.

Superintendent Walker and the chair of the
medical staff
tried repeatedly to coax more physicians
to attend
reminding them that their presence was
"tangible proof of
their interests in the hospital" and that
"it was their
major chance to express their views and to
influence
hospital policy." These pleas had no discernible
effect on
the staff.
Physicians had good reason not to attend
meetings.

Given the divisions within the hospital, staff

meetings were not usually occasion for much comradery.
Owing to the senior staff's stranglehold on policy, junior
staff had little reason to participate.

Moreover, due to

competition among the senior staff, staff members were more
likely to bicker than to be cheerful with one another.
Also, whatever their status, physicians faced persistent

new pressures from the Superintendent and outsiders which
they could resist but never eliminate.

Lastly, financial

shortfalls meant delays in getting needed supplies and made

expansion almost impossible.

The staff had little power to

remedy the situation.
Despite their vaunted corporate affiliations and
allegiances,

Springfield physicians were individualistic
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in the twenties and thirties;
freedom to decide their own
methods of practice was sacrosanct
to Springfield

physicians.

Now,

in the name of professionalism,
they were

pressured to surrender

a

portion of this precious right.

Their response was to resist demands
of colleagues and
outsiders whenever possible and they
withdrew from new
responsibilities whenever they could.
[52]

Springfield's physicians were successful
in rebuffing
stringent regulations until well after
World War Two.

Administrators allowed them to straggle along
at minimum
standards of accreditation organizations,
content to
operate at provisional status. [53]

Impact Of T he Depress inn
In the early months of the depression, few in

Springfield realized the severity of the economic crisis.
The Chamber Of Commerce, for example, called conditions

"basically good." It was difficult to remain optimistic
however,

when unemployment hit twenty-five percent in 19 3 2

and stayed there for more than two years.

Springfield

residents lost more than their jobs; some lost their

marriages and homes and became tramps;
minds and

some lost their

became "mental cases. "[54]

By the early 1930s, Springfield's welfare spending

amounted to ten times what it had been earlier but this
still wasn't enough to meet the emergency; city agencies,
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however, had no more money to
spend.

Meanwhile, charity

organizations were in no better shape;
far more people used
their services but contributions
had tumbled. [55]

In lieu of giving money, city
officials tried to
provide for the needy by hiring them
for juries, by

distributing coal and flour, by establishing
public
gardens, and by organizing football
and basketball
fundraisers.
For those who weren't satisfied with
city
aid, the Joyland Palace held dance
marathons where
contestants, except for comfort breaks and
cat
naps,

shuffled around and around and around for weeks
at

a

time. [56]

Under pressure from labor groups and others, city

officials tried to shake industry's money tree; local

manufacturers resisted the shakedown saying their branches
were bare.

In response,

city officials called the wealthy

uncooperative, selfish, and irresponsible.

predicted riots and revolution.

Some observers

The Chamber Of Commerce,

fearing potential social stife, finally took action.
formed

a

It

task force to recommend ways unemployed workers

might best use their limitless leisure

— aside

from staging

rent parties, pounding the pavement, foraging for food, or
copulating.
In the early years of the depression, city officials

insisted that Springfield could fully provide for its
indigent and therefore, could do without outside
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governmental aid.

The mayor's stance was
that if all
helped out, everyone would
get by.
Unfortunately, while
his voluntaristic vision
was uplifting, the support
and
cash to realize it never
materialized.

Funding adequate health care by
city agencies, private
charities, and hospitals was very
difficult because the
legions of unemployed and underemployed
and their families
were more susceptible to disease,
and suffered elevated
rates of tuberculosis, pneumonia,
and infant illnesses and
yet couldn't pay for treatment.
a sense, this was a
reprise of Springfield's experience in
the past decade but
on a much larger scale. [57]

m

With far more patients unable to pay their
bills,
Springfield Hospital's yearly deficit mushroomed.
In

response, the business office issued stern
reminders to
late payers, asked for payment prior to operations,
and

paid collectors to track down patients with delinquent
bills. [58]

Concerned that patients might be "trying to secure

a

bargain," medical staff leaders urged physicians to

carefully assay patients' financial health before deciding
on admittance, and to skimp on testing whenever possible.

Social workers spent even more time than before trying to

determine which patients were 'deserving' and which were
not. [59]
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,

outpatients were

a

particular problem for

Springfield^s smooth functioning.

Outpatient department

Clinics like Child guidance,
cardiac, and dermatological
continued to grow far more
rapidly than the rest of the
facility; yet, few of the
thousands who came by monthly
could pay for their care.
Superintendent Walker called the
department a serious financial
drain and a detriment;
he

wanted to review its status
and enact maximum quotas for
clinics.
In. the end, though, he did
nothing.
Springfield
did not want to risk public
condemnation by turning away
large numbers of the needy.
[60]
Staff physicians tried to devise
ways to bring more
paying patients into the hospital.
One encouraged hospital
trustees to get directly involved in
"selling" the
hospital, "why don't more acccident cases
come to the
hospital? Haven't our trustees any influence
with city
police or factory managements that can be
brought to bear
on this matter?" This followed a general
discussion in the
medical staff as to whether or not accident
cases were

financially rewarding to the hospital. [61]
The depression experience did not knit together the

medical staff.
divisions.

To the contrary, it widened existing staff

In Springfield, as elsewhere, there was more

competition among doctors during

a

decade in which

physician incomes in general declined precipitously and
those of general practitioners fell even more.
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]

]

In an economy in which much care was paid by
barter,

every solvent patient counted.

Those physicians who

monopolized certain procedures commanded extra fees but
antagonized their peers and exacerbated staff infighting

a:

witnessed by the controversy concerning who could
administer anesthesia and collect the accompanying fees.

Superintendent Walker referred to "selfish interests" at
work and "thoughts of personal gain" outweighing other
considerations.

This was

within the medical staff.
commensurate rewards.

a

fight over turf and expertise
To the victor would go the

Whether or not the victor was the

best qualified to administer anesthesthia was another
matter.

Left unaddressed by Walker and other hospital

officials through the decade was the question of who would

decide such questions.

Tensions remained .[ 62

Springfield Hospital's finances had always rested on

patient fees and donations, and to

government and charitable aid.
legacies were rare windfalls.

a

lesser extent

Unfortunately, sizable

Patients were

notoriously

unreliable about paying their bills; more than half of

chronically ill patients paid nothing at all, and
contributions of twenty-five to fifty cents per patient
from the Community Chest and city agencies failed to cover

hospital costs.

Investments in the thirties produced

paltry returns and dividends .[ 63
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Trustees sought more reliable sources of income;
they
got the Massachusetts Department of Public
Welfare
to

assume a larger share of the costs for indigent
cases;
arranged with the federal Veterans' Bureau to care

for its

clients; and pried welfare payments from surrounding
towns

Springfield's reliance on government support was

a

return

to its earliest days and for similar reasons; individuals

whether benefactors or patients or volunteers were unable
to fund the hospital on their own. [64]

Increased government support was crucial to the
survival of Springfield's healthcare institutions in the
thirties.

Until the depression years, city officials had

viewed healthcare mostly as

a

private matter, their own

role largely limited to monitoring and quarantining those

with contagious diseases along with providing modest
contributions for hospital care for the indigent and
clinic for venereal disease

(vd)

patients.

a

Once the

depression hit, health care outlays were cut by twenty-fiv
percent and the vd clinic closed; the money was needed for
schools, for the fire and police departments, and for

emergency relief.
The VNA was one of the health care groups hardest hit
by the depression.

Like others, it saw its budget cut,

staff reduced, services curtailed for emergencies, child
welfare, and deliveries.

The VNA and affiliated groups

were unable to serve the many needs of masses of destitute

persons at a

when one quarter of the population
was
receiving Com,unity Chest aid and
three quarters of that
went for emergency relief.
ti,»e

Chest leaders rallied the community
to assume greater
responsibility for social welfare
generally and health care
in particular.
They called on city officials to
increase
monies for free beds and outpatient
clinics.
Chest leaders
declared that adequate health care was
"vital to democracy"
and a social right. As in the twenties,
the VNA and
kindred groups called on city leaders to
devote more
resources for healthcare. Unlike the twenties,
however,
this time their appeals were taken seriously
by government
officials. [65]
Social problems that had earlier been neglected by

politicians and the public now became major social
concerns.

Springfield officials, like their counterparts

across the country, could not long ignore the plight of the
poor when their numbers doubled during the depression— the

vast majority of them had never asked or needed help
before.

City officials could no longer ignore charitable

groups like the Chest which spoke out on behalf of the
indigent.

A profound shift occurred in public attitudes

about government aid; what had been regarded as a

beneficence now was claimed as

a right,

what had had been a

social disgrace had now become a matter of basic dignity;
Soon, politicians like Mayors Dwight Winter and Henry
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Martens "found" substantially
.ore .oney for social welfare
including health care because they
knew that otherwise they
would be suimarily booted from
office,
city outlays for
hospital care alone increased by
ten times from 1930 to the
mid-thirties. [66J
Conclusi on

By the end of the thirties,
charitable organizations

had succeeded in helping to expand
and improve the city' s
health care resources. Some Chest
officials wanted to g,
further; they spoke of broader social
planning to assure
adequate health care. Such ideas did not
get very far;
their proponents were outsiders or minor
players in the
health care hierarchy who lacked any significant
leverage
in area hospitals,

local politics, or the business or

professional elite. [67]
As the city physician noted in 1938, Springfield's

health care remained "fragmented and uncoordinated."
Health care devolved onto individual physicians at
individual hospitals--notably Springf ield--with little

effort to organize services within hospitals or between
them or to coordinate hospital services with charitable

organizations or city agencies. [68]
Springfield Hospital's experience and that of the city

generally highlighted the weakness of the supposed vanguard
of American medicine whether specialists, medical school

deans, or hospital administrators.
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Though Springfield was

no backwater institution in the
thirties,

its general

practitioners generally reigned supreme.

Springfield

physicians successfully obstructed efforts
to change the
organization or delivery of services.
Physicians' sovereignity rested on maximum

professional autonomy; the result had been systematic
disarray; total autonomy led to increased staff
divisions,

poor service, low standards, and weak education.

Yet,

physicians' insistence on autonomy trumped other interests

who lacked comparable professional authority.

Neither

administrators nor foundations, neither medical schools,

accrediting agencies, or government filled the breach.

Not

until after World War Two did Springfield Hospital begin to

develop an organizational structure commensurate with its
growing importance to area residents.
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CHAPTER

4

SPRINGFIELD HOSPITAL 1940-1960

"Hundreds of people... for the first time have the

means of paying...
body

to remove some burden from mind and

reported the Springfield Union in May of 1943.

"

During World War Two, Springfield's prominence as an arms'

manufacturing center resulted in boom times for workers
employed at Smith and Wesson, the Colt company, and other
area firms.

Many of these workers enrolled in company-

sponsored insurance plans which had been first introduced
in the late thirties but had dramatically expanded during

wartime.

By 1943 an estimated one half of daily admissions

were carrying some sort of insurance.
hospital derived the
these sources.

By 1944, the

majority of its patient income from

[1]

Although more people were covered by insurance plans
than before, patient admissions remained level with those
of the pre-war years.

Due to staff shortages,

(more than

one third of Springfield's physicians as well as many

nurses served abroad)

,

as well as rationing of medical

supplies,

Springfield could not significantly expand its

services.

Following the war however, with the return of

hospital personnel, continued prosperity, increasing
numbers of persons covered by insurance as well as by

public agencies, Springfield registered remarkable growth
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in patient admissions and treatment.

The emergency unit

and outpatient surgery department, the
laboratories and xray services all reported increases,
sometimes jumping
fifteen to twenty-five percent annually.
[2]

By the late 1950s, more than 70% of
Springfield's

patients received health care through a combination
of
private insurance plans, federal, state, and city aid,

private relief agencies,

of all these programs,

and

insurance

was the most important; Springfield residents were among
the more than 100 million Americans (up from 30 million
in
1945)

—covering more than half

of the country's population

-who received health insurance from one of more than 500

insurance companies .[ 3

While health insurance immeasurably improved the well
being and peace of mind for millions of Americans, it was
not always a satisfactory arrangement for patients or

providers.

Insurance plans usually paid a fraction of

hospital and physician fees.

In the mid 50s, they covered

one quarter of private expenses for health services which
is one reason why loans for medical expenses were the

mainstay of small loan companies.

Insurance plans which

typically covered a small portion of charges for acute
conditions (leaving out many services like medications,
rehabilitation, and home health care)

,

had no provisions

for treatment for those with chronic medical problems and

barred persons with preexisting conditions.
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Some insurers

did Offer special policies
dubbed major medical plans to
cover their own existing gaps
in coverage but these were
too expensive for most
Americans-less than 10% of whom had
major medical protection by i960.
[4]

Blue cross and Blue Shield were
the two major nonprofit corporations that tried to
cover the gaps of the
private insurers. Aside from their
regular subscribers,
they also enrolled the elderly,
the chronically ill, and
others locked out of private insurance
plans.
Unlike the
private insurers, they initially offered
the same plan to
all subscribers at the same cost in a
given community and
thus kept premiums relatively low for
those with greater
medical expenses. The "Blues" however steadily
lost

customers in the fifties to insurance companies
offering
cheaper plans to healthier enrollees, leaving
Blue Cross
and Blue Shield with the more costly patients.

As a

result, premiums were raised, which further drove

policy

holders into the arms of the "privates" and ultimately
made

policies too expensive for many, especially the elderly
living on fixed incomes.

[5]

Government agencies, whether city, state, or federal,

were supposed to cover the gaps of the privates and the
Blues.

Unfortunately, state programs typically paid just

one half of actual patient costs.

Hospitals in turn tried

to make up the shortfall by charging private insurers more

who then passed on the added expense to their enrollees.
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all of which made insurance more
difficult to afford for
everyone. [6]

Springfield's difficulties wresting adequate
fees from
third party payors came at a time when the
Hospital's
financial situation had become more volatile
than ever
before.

Expenses soared due to rapid increases in the
cost

of labor and supplies, and the added expenses
of new

services, the decision by Springfield trustees and

physicians to expand its medical education program and to
construct many new facilities, and increasing government
regulations.

Planning budgets and then working within them

thereby became a more difficult enterprise.

And unlike

earlier years, trustees could no longer settle accounts

with a check at the end of the year.

[7]

To make up for the shortfall, Springfield regularly

raised its rates for patients covered by private health
insurance.

from five to

In the fifties, Springfield increased its rates

fifteen percent a year

— double

the previous

decade and more than double the inflation rate overall.

These were astonishing figures given that revenues from

patients had soared four hundred percent since 1945.

[8]

Springfield battled constantly with third party payors
to obtain contracts that would provide some significant

portion of the hospital's operating costs.

Hospital

administrators insisted that payors pony up the actual
costs of services incurred by the hospital, wrangling with
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Blue cross and Blue Shield,
insurance companies, the
Wor3c.en^s Compensation
Insurance Commission, the
Department
Of welfare, and the Community
chest.
The disputes centered
on Whether payors should
pay for the cost of their
specific
patients alone, or the more
general costs borne by the
hospital including medical
education, outpatient, nonpayors, and so on. How to define
"usual" versus "special"
charges, how to decide who would
determine these, how to
enforce these rates, and the means
to challenge them as
appropriate was the subject of continual
negotiations in
the 1950s.

Springfield's officials fretted over the many
individuals who were unable to get group
health insurance
coverage (which provided the best coverage
at the least
cost) because of retirement, self -employment
or employment
in small businesses.
According to Springfield's business
office, the only option for 'insurance orphans'
was to buy
individual policies with "high premiums and very little

protection," for whom claims were often rejected because
"of certain well hidden clauses in the policies." The

business office concluded, "many policy holders ...judge
the workings of the voluntary health insurance

unsatisfactory

.

"

[

9

Hospital officials issued guidelines to the medical
staff explaining which insurance policies covered which

procedures urging them to make sure that patients had
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sufficient insurance coverage
before ordering tests, and
conducting thorough exa.s lest
the patient's insurer
fail
to cover the charges and the
patient fail to .ake up the
difference leaving Springfield
stuck with
the bill.

Also,

even inore than before, the
outpatient department and
emergency room became both the
"doctor's office"

for the

indigent and the hardpressed and
the preferred site of
treatment for those without means in
order to save beds for
paying patients. These two departments
outstripped nearly
all others in the 40s and 50s in
their increase in patient
admissions 10]
.

[

Elderly Springfield residents had the
most difficult
time paying for medical care. As was
true nationally, they
used health services more frequently than
others and had
greater health care expenses. Most insurance
companies
denied them coverage, cancelled coverage when
they reached
a

certain age, or charged them prohibitively high

premiums—representing about 15% of their income— for
policies that covered very little. [11]
The Springfield Visiting Nurse Association helped the

many elderly who could not afford hospital care, or who had
been released precipitously from Springfield and other
hospitals, or who could not afford to enter a nursing home.

Most of the elderly ill lived alone-"shut-ins"-and were
left to fend for themselves, though VNA staff judged 20% of
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their patients should have been receiving
immediate
hospital care. [12]
The VNA provided as best they could for
shut-ins but
due to meagre private funding and a
dangerously heavy
caseload, VNA leaders found it practically
impossible to
hire or retain competent committed nurses.
Moreover, with
too many patients to care for, it was impossible
to provide
any of them decent care, causing much frustration
and

anguish among the nurses.
lasted just

43

The average thrice weekly visit

minutes though many patients needed daily

visits for much longer periods. [13]
In one respect, though, the elderly served by the VNA

were the lucky ones.

At least they had some privacy and

individual attention unlike the elderly poor lodged at the
city's decrepit "infirmary." There, they shared jammed

quarters with homeless families and unmarried pregnant
women, along with the retarded and mentally ill.

understaf f ing (and underf unding)

,

Due to

the city physician

visited each patient approximately 30 seconds per day,
"inmates" went without night time attendants, and apple

sauce was the staple food. [14]
Springfield officials were reluctant to turn away
indigent patients, but could not afford to take them all
free of charge.

That is why throughout the

4

0s and 50s,

Springfield administrators spent an inordinate share of
their time and energy at meetings and conferences.
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wrestling with the "all important
reimbursable cost
problem... The hospital constantly
tussled with public
agencies over funding arrangements,
reaching temporary
agreements which were then rendered
inoperable because of
rising costs. [15]

Raising rates and the cost shifting
that such
increases were partly designed to
enforce was partly
Springfield's answer to stinginess of
government and nonprofit agencies. Springfield had an even
greater problem
with these payors than with private ones
regarding

full and

timely payments.

Hospital officials constantly complained

about one sided, unfair arrangements where
these were
concerned.
Neither government agencies nor the non-profits
ever seemed willing to allocate what physicians
and

administrators deemed reasonable sums for payment.
[16]
In the late fifties, Springfield, along with other

hospitals, asked the Massachusetts Hospital Association
to

analyze hospitals' average costs so that state auditors
could then determine satisfactory rates.

The Association

duly devised what it deemed appropriate guidelines, but
these were rejected by the State.

Springfield and sister

hospitals throughout the state then fixed on other means to

make up the shortfall.

In anticipation of meagre payments

from the non-profits and public agencies, they raised rates

well in advance of new rates set by state bodies.

They

created a new .'entrance charge,', but this was quickly
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discovered and banned by the
Department of Public Health;
they next tried to tack on an
increased room rate for thl
first 5 days of patient stays.
This too was struck down by
State of f icials. [17]

Area-wide planning of services by
Springfield's
hospitals might have helped reduce
costs.
And in fact,
beginning in 1946, federal legislation
required that
hospitals join planning ventures as
a prerequisite for
obtaining government loans for expansion
purposes.

Hospitals were to coordinate services under
the auspices of
state health departments on a local, state,
and regional
basis, would devise plans to meet present
demands
for

health care and to anticipate future needs.

However, these

planning boards remained paper organizations
through the
fifties, and Washington simply issued the equivalent
of

blank checks to enable Springfield and sister institutions
to expand their respective domains without any outside

interference.

Hospital planning would not occur until the

mid sixties, and only under enormous pressure from state

agencies and the public; even then planning was done only
to a very modest degree and with much ambivalence by

administrators, trustees, and physicians.

Until then,

Springfield officials' attitude about planning was simply,
'If we don't build the beds,

someone else will. '[18]

Springfield and hospitals generally objected to inter-

hospital planning ventures because these were to be
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controlled by outsiders, especially
state agencies;
furthermore, their plans might
have become

compulsory, and

therefore could result in
reduction of services or restrict
Springfield's future expansion.
However, Hospital
Officials did embrace a planning
proposal in 1946 presented
by representatives of the
Rockefeller
Foundation.

The

Foundation in conjunction with
physician and hospital
associations, government agencies,
leading insurance
companies, and several major
corporations had launched a
planning effort that would be wholly
voluntary, privately
administered, and locally based.
The Foundation's proposal called for
Springfield to
become a full-fledged medical center
and to constitute
itself as the hub of a regional hospital
network in the
Pioneer Valley. The proposal called on
Springfield
to

launch several new units, to purchase thousands
of dollars'
worth of new equipment, to form several new
departments, to

expand others, and to hire scores of new staff.
[19]
The proposal met with enthusiasm from trustees,

administrators, and physicians, eager to revitalize

Springfield's operations after more than

straitened circumstances.

a

decade of

A "Future of Springfield

Committee" was soon formed; Committee members quickly

determined that radical changes were in order
having to do with medical practice.

—

especially

Committee members

believed that to improve and expand hospital services, it
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would be necessary to reduce
the medical staff's
prerogatives. To assure higher
standards of medical
practice, closer oversight of
physician performance was
warranted.
Committee members also believed
that to meet
the growing responsibilities
imposed on hospitals
by

insurers, state agencies, and
the courts (in the matter of
liability), while satisfying the
public's higher
expectations for quality health care,
physicians needed to
be more accountable to hospital
officials and under tighter
control of medical staff and hospital
governing

authorities. [20]

News of the Committee's intentions caused

a

near

revolt of some of Springfield's leading
physicians
including the Chair of the Staff Council.
1947,

Dr.

W.A.R.

In January of

Chapin delivered a speech to the

Council in which he accused the trustees, the
superintendent, and elements of the medical staff of

upending traditional aproaches to medical care.

He charged

that the Committee and the Board had unilaterally overruled
the Council's policy that physicians new to Springfield

serve in a voluntary capacity in the outpatient department

before receiving formal appointments, and that the

committee had engineered

a

rush of promotions through the

staff council without the approval of the staff council.
He also claimed the committee supplanted the staff council
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as the major governing body
of the hospital, thereby

creating

breach between the board and
the staff. [21]
Chapin's declaration was a bit
overblown.
After all,
a

four of the six members
of the new committee.

partly from above.

of the staff council were
members
if this was a takeover,

it was

But Chapin was clearly on the mark
in

stating that the committee had
supplanted the authority of
the staff council; half of the
committee's members were
from the outpatient staff-men of short
tenure and juniornot senior- staff.
Clearly, Chapin represented
a

large

portion of Springfield's staff; in the coming
years, they
would even occasionally outvote the insurgents.
But

Superintendent Eugene Walker and his allies were
not
dissuaded by the broadside. Walker even confirmed
many of
Chapin 's charges. He defiantly remarked that if the
staff

was edged aside in some matters, it was "due to their
own

shortcomings." He granted that the medical staff had

autonomy over medical matters but not over administrative
policies; in those matters the Superintendent and trustees

had proper purview, that in any event the Board's

responsibility over the institution took precedence over
that of the staff or the superintendent.

Walker was also being disingenuous.

Like Chapin,

What were now declared

administrative matters (and so the job of the
superintendent and trustees) had long been conducted by the
staff alone.
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The effort to broaden
physicians' responsibilities and
to reduce their independence
led to a long lasting tug
of
war between reformers (the
"young turks" as they were
called) and the hospital's old
guard.
Reformers tried to
convince other members of the
medical staff that

relinquishing a measure of their
independence and assuming
new responsibilities would actually
enhance their
professional status. Springfield would
vastly improve its
functioning and staff members would
thereby enjoy greater
prestige, more hospital resources,
increased patient
referrals, and higher incomes.

Reformers shared several things in common;
most were

young men, specialists, Jewish, and, most
importantly,
veterans. As military physicians, their
wartime experience
had provided intensive training that otherwise
might have
taken many years of medical practice. They had
learned
about the latest new drugs and therapies and the
most

advanced methods of diagnosis and treatment.

They had

assumed responsibilities and leadership roles that, as
junior physicians back in Springfield, would have been

closed to them.

Following military service, many of them

had taken specialty courses in Boston, New York, and other
centers of medical education and research.

After

completing those programs and returning to Springfield,
they had much higher expectations of the institution than
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their colleagues, and clear ideas
about how to meet the
local health care challenges
of the postwar period.
[22]
Many of the veterans were Jews
who had earlier
experienced discrimination at
Springfield in staff
assignments and in promotions-not
to mention the slights
and stings of being treated as
social outcasts by the
city's elite. However, following
the war, anti-semitism
had generally declined due to its
association with nazism.
Also, Jewish veterans had acguired
a degree of medical
expertise that could not be ignored or
dismissed and was in
great demand. And above all, Jewish
veterans had served
their country and now claimed their
rightful place; they
could no longer be denied a say in shaping
hospital
policies. [23]

Revamping medical education was key to reformers'
plans for expansion.

Interns were to be key figures in the

new medical education program.

Increasing the numbers and

quality of interns (and later residents) would help

visiting physicians attend to the growing numbers of
patients; interns would largely staff the outpatient

clinics and wards; their medical school training would

provide visiting staff with exposure to the most up-to-date
therapies and diagnostic techniques, and their postgraduate training at Springfield would provide them the

experience

necessary to become top-notch practitioners.

All of this would put the hospital in the good graces of
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accreditation authorities, the
Springfield community,
government agencies, and private
insurance companies.

During the war, few doctors
had given the time and
energy to properly train
interns.
As a teaching hospital,
senior staff were supposed to
closely involve interns in
their activities, to discusss
cases with them, to generally
help interns integrate their
theoretical training with
practical experience. Yet, most doctors
refused
to be

mentors.

As before, interns largely unassisted
tried to
learn their trade on the general wards
where the poor and
elderly were unlikely to register
complaints against what
was at best lackluster care. [24]

The word went out on the medical school
grapevine in
the early forties that an internship at
Springfield was a
wasted year. Springfield was unable to get
enough interns
to staff its ward service. As the situation
deteriorated,

Springfield took virtually any medical school graduate
who
applied.
Some were barely competent, and others were
chosen "out of pity and despair ." [25]
In the years following the war, many physicians still

refused to aid the educational program; they were unwilling
to increase the number of autopsies, which would have

increased the amount of "material" available for study by

house staff.

Many physicians devoted only minimal time to

ward service or outpatient clinics, leading to further
overwork of the house staff.

Of those physicians who
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grudgingly participated in the
educational program, .any
preferred "didactic conferences,"
in which interns would
simply observe their senior
colleagues during patient
treatment rather than participating
in any meaningful
fashion, in order to avoid
imposing on senior staff's
patients. Meanwhile, in the late
forties, interns worked
far above the national norm of
12 0 hours a week and because
of understaffing one intern
often had to cover an entire
ward for months at a time. When they
faltered, student
nurses were pressed into service for
duties they were
utterly unprepared for. [26]
Senior staff not only neglected intern
training in the
war years and immediately afterwards, they
also neglected
their own post-graduate education. Few attended
post-

graduate classes, despite Superintendent Walker's

entreaties and occasional reminders from some senior
staff.
Few physicians engaged in ongoing self-education
efforts
either; the library depended on castoffs and donations,
and

received paltry grants from the Staff Council of just one

hundred dollars

a year.

Such a pittance reflected the fact

that few physicians spent any time there. [27]

Following the war, as before, hospital leaders

appealed to the medical staff to fully support the
educational program.
impact.

As before, the requests had little

Now, however, sanctions were finally imposed

against indifferent and recalcitrant physicians; pressure
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from accrediting organizations (especially
the AMA which
was now under control of specialists
and academic
physicians) was the precipitating cause
here.
The limited
scope of the education program and the
limited involvement
of senior staff threatened to jeopardize
the hospital's
standing and destroy plans for expansion.
[28

In 1951, physicians were informed that
henceforth

participation in the educational program would be a
condition for staff appointment, reappointment and hospital
privileges.

Furthermore, junior staff were told that if

they participated energetically in the education program
they could expect rapid promotion; seniority would no
longer be decisive in determining
clout.

a

physician's status and

Loyal and active younger men could now leapfrog

over presumed deadwood in the hospital. [29]
By the mid late fifties, the education program had

finally taken root.

A full time Director of Education had

been appointed and was in clear command.

Senior staff were

more thoroughly involved in the education program than ever
before, holding regular rounds and conferences, and using

their private patients to instruct interns.

Interns were

finally assigned specific operating rooms to guarantee that
they would gain experience in surgery.

The library was

fully funded and amply stocked, and large numbers of

physicians attended continuing education programs .[ 30]
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As with the matter of physician
involvement in intern
education, until the postwar period,
the use of anesthesia
had been entirely the prerogative of
Springfield

physicians.

The only exception was that gas anesthesia
not

be given to "anyone under fifteen or
any colored person."

Aside from this stipulation, anesthesia was not
regulated
either by the medical staff or hospital superintendent.
Hospital officials simply hoped that "eventually" a
given
anesthesia might be administered in the same way at all
times. [31]

The pitfalls of the laisse-faire approach were

illustrated in 1943 when two patients died because of
improper application of sodium penthathol.

In the absence

of detailed patient records from Springfield and comparable

institutions, it is impossible to determine the

circumstances surrounding these deaths.
and its aftermath is worth noting.

Still, the tragedy

Apparently, the case

was never investigated by legal authorities and no

sanctions were taken against those at fault.

Following the

incident, senior medical staff members did ask that sodium

penthathol be used only in "selected cases," but failed to
define what "selected cases" meant or who would then be

allowed to apply sodium penthathol.

By the late forties,

however, with the adoption of a more rigorous regime

overseeing physicians, Springfield had established an

Anesthesiology department which imposed strict guidelines
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to determine physician
competency to administer the
various
types of anesthesia .[
32

increased oversight of medical
practice was also
evident in the formation of the
Medical Audit Committee in
the late forties. The committee
was responsible for the
thorough and timely compilation
and review of all medical
records especially those having
to do with complications,
deaths, infections, and wrong
diagnoses.

With comprehensive medical records,
and proper regular
evaluation of them, physicians, hospital
administrators,
and accreditation agencies could
better gauge the

performance and quality of Sprngfield's
medical care and
problems could be brought to light and
corrected.

The Medical Audit Committee was in the
vanguard of
reformers at Springfield Hospital. Some staff
physicians
fought the committee's actions at every turn,
trying to

keep the committee small and powerless; the few
who were
allowed to serve were overwhelmed by the work.
In
the

early years of its existence, committee members were

reduced to sending out letters to physicians, outlining
their responsibilities and the expectations of the hospital
as far as adequate and complete records were concerned.
[33

Relegated to the most basic accumulation and

maintenance of records as far as monitoring doctors was
concerned, Committee members walked softly and carried a

thin reed.

However, once Springfield faced losing its
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accreditation over the matter, laggards
were told they
would lose admitting privileges or be
passed over for
promotions. They soon fell in line and
the committee was
able to properly do its job. [34]

Another fracas involving an oversight body
occurred in
1952 when Springfield formed a tissue committee
to better
evaluate surgeon's work and to rate their
competence.
In response, several doctors-particular
ly surgeons-called
for a combined Tissue and Medical Audit Committee.

Surgeons who abhorred more extensive evaluation of their
own work reasoned— correctly— that if the Committee had
to
do both, it would likely do neither well, or by default, it

would concentrate on narrow record keeping. [35]
Accreditation authorities eventually entered the fray,
insisting that Springfield abide by national standards for

evaluation of surgeons.
and running.

Soon the Tissue Committee was up

As in other disputes of the postwar period,

some Springfield doctors succeeded in forestalling changes,

but were ultimately compelled to implement them, under

edict from outside agencies and the efforts of internal
reformers. [36]

Most Springfield doctors supported the hospital's

restructuring and the expansion of the local health care
system in the fifties.

Springfield doctors proudly

highlighted hospital developments as a model of advances in
medicine and surgery, in diagnosis and treatment.
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However,

physicians were fearful about the
consequences of such
changes.
Springfield physicians felt pressured
to adopt
methods that at times seemed more
akin to a mass production
system and worried that they might
soon become creatures of
"hospital administrative militants"
who would render them
powerless. Moreover, physicians felt
locked in mortal
combat with outsiders over the organization,
financing, and
delivery of health care, and saw that their
cherished
independence steadily chipped away in a seemingly
harebrain
maze of regulations, accreditation requirements,
and

confiscatory arrangements with third party payors.
Embattled physicians seethed whenever Blue Cross and
other
insurers revised its rates and coverage to the detriment

of

hospitals and physicians and when they read of new state
laws restricting various aspects of medical practice.

They

felt degraded by the increased powers of the state's

department of public health and resented the insurers
demands for needlessly complex multiforms for claims that
only covered half their costs. [37]

Springfield doctors had good reason to believe that
the government, the Blues, and the private insurers, were
all congenitally incapable of administrating health care in
a rational,

fair, or productive way.

This is why they had

favored the growth of private health insurance as the means
to avoid government control of the

health care system.

Little did they realize that what would emerge in the
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postwar period would be

maddening hybrid characterized
by
intrusive bureaucracy, dependency
on a host of new outside
agencies, increased costs,
and unfair rates of compensation
for medical services-just
what opponents of government
control had fought against.
[38]
a

It could be argued that by
i960, Springfield had
embarked on a thorough transformation.
By insisting that

doctors keep accurate records, by
requiring them to be
seriously committed to the education
program, and by

establishing means to evaluate physicians'
competence, farsighted doctors, administrators, and
trustees fundamentally
changed the hospital.
However, events at decade's end indicated
that

Springfield's restructuring was by no means
complete or
secure.
Operating income failed to match
expenses.

The

major reason was that ward admissions, which
had been less
than fifteen percent of total admissions in the
early
1950s, soared to twenty-five percent by

reversal of earlier trends.
that

1959— a striking

Springfield officials reported

increasing health care costs was the reason for the

growth in ward admissions, and that elderly patients in

particular were less able to afford private health
insurance.

Many of the new ward patients were unable to

pay in full for their care, others were subsidized by

government programs that covered a small portion of costs.
The hospital had to make hefty charge-off s, totalling
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hundreds of thousands of dollars, for bad
debts, for free
work, and for underpayment from welfare
cases.
This led to
mounting deficits. Revenue from patients who
paid out of
pocket and third party payors was not enough
to make up the
shortfall.
Springfield could have sharply raised
its fees,

but chose not to.

Apparently administrators feared adverse

community reaction, especially after so many other rate
increases in recent years.

Also, if rates had been

increased much more, even more patients would have

defaulted on their bills and the hospital would fall into
worse straits.

As a result, in 1958 and 1959, Springfield

faced serious financial problems, and to cover its losses

was forced to make abrupt large-scale transfers from its

endowment to its operating funds. [39]
As the situation deteriorated, Springfield's plans for

further expansion were put on hold; hospital leaders were
not sure if there was enough community support for such

expansion.

This was understandable as in recent years the

hospital had not had to gauge community feeling before

embarking on building projects, instead relying on

government loans for the bulk of construction funds.
Hospital officials, previously confident that the apparent

benefits of expansion would be enough to win and sustain

community support, were no longer so certain.

What to do?

Administrators and trustees explored the possibility of
hiring professional fundraisers.
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—
Hospital expansion had been the major balm
for
physicians harried by increasing controls
on their medical
practice. with the financial shortfall,
departments like
surgery, pediatrics, anesthesiology, and
pathology, vied
for funds, made appeals to would-be
benefactors in annual
reports, vented their despair and outrage in
letters to

high hospital officials, and used brinksmanship—
complete
with resignations and threats to resign if such and
such
was not bought, renovated, hired, and so on. [40]
The turmoil in the hospital caused great tensions

between the staff and the administration.

Under terrible

pressure, administration officials were overwhelmed by the

hospital's problems.

Trustees and medical staff

established a committee to try to determine appropriate
priorities and organizational structures for the

beleaguered institution.

As early as 1957, such a

committee had been proposed, but had been rejected by
medical staff members who feared that the committee would
act as a cabal that would encroach on staff prerogatives

and overrule the opinion of medical staff.

But with the

hospital on the verge of disaster, the medical staff

approved the proposal for

a

Joint Conference Committee.

Significantly, staff members were apparently influenced

— as

they had been at so many crucial junctures in that decade
by reports and recommendations from the Hospital Council of

the AMA stressing the importance of such committees.
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One

of the first acts of the committee
was to hire an outside
consultant to examine the state of the
hospital, and to

determine the "best methods of providing
good and
sufficient administration."
The decisions to hire a consulting firm,
and to form a
Joint Conference Committee, were sensible.
Whether these
would lead to long-term solutions to Springfield's
problems
was another matter altogether. It must have
been ironic to
hospital leaders that the decade of the hospital's
greatest
expansion, marked by a surge in patients, services,

equipment, and personnel, was also the period of the

greatest antagonism within the staff, the most ferocious
conflicts between staff members and administration, and
constant battles between Springfield and government
agencies, along with enduring financial strains.

Efforts

to address these problems would consume the energies of

Springfield officials well into the 1960s.
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CHAPTER

5

SPRINGFIELD HOSPITAL 1960-1980
By 1960, due to overcrowding,
antiquated equipment,
and staff shortages,
Springfield's functioning sank to
almost code blue status. Pathologists
were unable to
perform basic duties because of
contamination in their
makeshift space; laboratory personnel,
due to abysmal
conditions, could no longer conduct
accurate or

reproducible test procedures; due to
substandard nursing
care, patients were developing
infections and
complications.

The most basic amenities and sanitary

measures were neglected; one enraged physician
reported
that his patient's linen hadn't been changed
in

four days.

Close to half of physicians took their patients
to other
area hospitals, and some openly spoke of switching
hospital
allegiances.

The pressure and problems took their toll on

the administration.

In 1960 alone, the Comptroller, the

Nursing Supervisor, the Nursing Director, the Assistant
Executive Director, and the Executive Director all quit.[l]
The crisis in the nursing staff was particularly
acute.

Large numbers of resignations steadily cut nursing

ranks.

This posed a double threat to Springfield; due to

the nursing shortage

— only

half as many nurses were

employed as were needed— entire floors had to be closed,

costing the hospital thousands of dollars per month.
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Moreover, the nursing shortage
foreclosed any possibility
Of future expansion.
[2]
By the winter of 1962,
Springfield's medical advisory
board reported that the Hospital
no longer met its
Obligations, either to staff or
to patients, and was on the
brink of disaster. Some months
later, a senior staff
member reported, "many patients are
going to other
hospitals. They are losing confidence
in Springfield: they
feel the hospital and physicians cannot
be depended
on.

[Springfield's] public image continues to

deteriorate. ..."

[3]

Nonetheless, Springfield Hospital survived
the crisis.
It did so by accelerating its development
into a regional
medical center and thereby expanding its scope
of medical
services, widening its patient base and substantially

boosting its revenues.

It also forged closer ties with

medical schools in Boston and Albany, and with Boston
hospitals.

Private organizations and government agencies,

like the National Institutes of Health, the Dexter and
the

Ford Foundations, and the U.S. Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, all provided seed money for new

programs ranging from cardiac surgery to cancer
research. [4]
The financial problems of the early sixties dissipated
by mid-decade.

Construction of new facilities drew new

inpatient admissions as did the growth of special services.

The most important factor,
however, in Springfield's
improved fortunes was the
introduction in 1966 of Medi care
and Medicaid, government
supported health care programs
f or
millions Of the poor, the elderly,
and the disabled.
Thes e
programs were the center-piece of
the Johnson

administrations 's social welfare
reforms.
Federal budget
outlays for health services alone
tripled from 1965 to
1970: the major portion of the monies
went to Medicare and,
to a lesser extent, to Medicaid.
The programs helped to
dramatically reduce infant mortality and
to increase the
life expectancy of the elderly; they
also narrowed
the

disparity between the poor and the middle
classes and
between blacks and whites with respect to
health care
access and health status generally.

According to James

Patterson, the safety net created by these programs
helped
cause a 50% drop in poverty rates between 1959 and

1974. [5]

Medicare and Medicaid enabled Springfield Hospital to
increase its patient admissions but more importantly to

sharply reduce its charity work (in 1966 alone, free work

declined 15%).

By 1967, as the result of government

largess and Springfield's expanded operations, Springfeld's

Finance Committee declared that the hospital's finances

were stable and predictable; financial reports, which for
years had been an occasion of much hand-wringing, now

happily detailed Springfield's rosy curcumstances

.

So

confident were the administrators about the hospital's
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fiscal health that financial
meetings were convened monthly
instead of weekly, and employees
were given a.ple increases
in pensions, salaries,
and other benefits.
[6]
By 1968, Springfield's
achievements in teaching,
research, and comprehensive
patient care had made it the
dominant health care institution
in Western Massachusetts;
Trustees changed its name to
Springfield Hospital Medical
Center (and then to the Medical
Center of Western
Massachusetts) to register the fact.
[7]

Springfield's development into

a

medical center

proved controversial among the medical
staff.
Many
Springfield physicians realized that
primary care slipped
to secondary importance in comparison
to specialty care,
that the lion's share of monies, of
administrative posts,
and of expansion projects were devoted
to specialty
services, and that specialty care was
increasingly the
focal point of Springfield's education
program.

Primary

care physicians bristled at administrative
actions that
favored specialists in admitting privileges, in

appointments, and in determining Springfield's general

development.

[8]

In the sixties and early seventies, in debates about

staffing, about community services, about hospital

programs, and other matters, advocates of primary care

criticized Springfield's priorities.

Primary care

physicians argued that Springfield should devote more
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resources to chronic rather than just
acute care; they
questioned the need and cost of special
services like
kidney transplant centers and elaborate
cardiac surgery
programs given the growing body of elderly
chronic patients
in the Springfield area.
Hospital officials responded that
chronic patients were not their appropriate
purview and
could simply be cared for in nursing homes, that
they
didn't need hospital care and most importantly were
taking
beds needed by acute patients who not incidentally
usually
had higher reimbursement rates.

Hospital officials also

believed that the surge in the numbers of chronic patients
was a very temporary phenomenon and so were generally

uninterested in building facilities for chronic
patients.

[9]

Various state agencies also pressured Springfield to

modify its emphasis on acute care, persuading Springfield
to open clinics and other facilities to combat alcoholism

and drug addiction, and to offer health centers for the
unemployed.

Unfortunately, state agencies' interest in

such projects was usually fleeting and episodic, and often

not backed up by funds to help defray the costs of the
clinics. 10]
[

Sometimes, grassroots efforts impelled Springfield to

take action.

In 1968, a coalition of community activists,

University of Massachusetts Nursing and Public Health
students, and some sympathetic Springfield physicians
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established

clinic at a local housing
project,
while
Springfield officials publicly
supported the clinic, most
hospital leaders viewed it as
a
distraction from thei r
-real' mission of acute care,
arguing that the clini c was
trying to address social problems
that were not
a

Springfield's responsibility.

Consequently, Springfield

allotted just token monies for the
clinic; without adequate
funding, it soon ceased to provide
adequate medical care
and became a screening f acility
ii]
.

[

in the early sixties, spurred by
federal agencies and
supported by the Citizens Action Committee,
(a group of

businessmen and prof essionals— the self-styled
"real
leaders" of Springfield who gathered
regularly for lunches
at a local insurance company to discuss
worthy projects)

study was made of Springfield's health needs.

,

a

Committee

members visited all the health care facilities
in
Springfield; they met with the principal administrators
and
leading physicians, and gathered information about

Springfield's health care problems.

They discovered a

serious "disjuncture between hospitals and the community"
and "a serious lack of planning betwen the two," asserting

that area hospitals neglected consideration of community
needs in their planning and expansion ventures.

Committee

members urged that local hospitals undertake voluntary
cooperative planning

— conscious

that compulsory measures

would have been rejected by the parties involved as
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]

unreasonable interference in
hospital affairs.
the last thing anyone wanted
was hospitals

After all,

"run comparable

to utilities and so subject
to red tape." when the study
was concluded,
its chair explained that the
committee's
findings were not "to be smiled
at and put on a shelf....
The idea is to get citizens to
see the need and take
action. "[12]
One result of the Committee's work
was the formation,
in 1966, of the Connecticut Valley
Health Planning Council
(CVHPC) whose mission was to target
unmet health care
needs, to devise programs to meet them,
and to help reduce

duplication of services and to promote maximum
economies.
CVHPC was one of scores of such councils
estblished

nationally during the sixties as a voluntary
venture
between local hospitals and physicians and state

and

federal authorities.

Springfield leaders initially

welcomed the creation of the CVHPC.

They thought it would

help to forestall more intrusive government involvement;
they assumed that Springfield would be the key player in
the Council thus enshrining its own leadership, leading
to

greater public support for its projects, and resulting in
additional funds for its programs .[ 13
In its early years, the Council had a budget of less

than twenty-thousand dollars, its operating funds donated
by local hospitals, and a small staff of hospital

administrators assigned on

a

rotating basis.
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Despite

]

Springfield's intentions, it failed to
dominate the
council; instead, Springfield settled
for a tacit
understanding with the other participating
hospitals that
the Council would impose few restraints
on any hospital's
expansion plans. Discussions focused far more
on holding
the line on nurses' salaries or joint
purchase of supplies
than on area hospitals' various building projects
or
on

addressing community health care problems.

[

14

Springfield officials proclaimed in their annual

reports that all had access to its services and would be

properly attended to.

But,

in fact, non-acute care

occupied a marginal place in Springfield medical care.
Senior physicians and residents avoided service in clinics
and out-patient departments, in the emergency ward, and in

preventive and primary care medicine generally.

An

evaluation committee in 1966 reported that patient care was

variable at best and poor in the emergency ward and
outpatient departments.

Both emergency services and

outpatient clinics were growing rapidly and served an
important community need. Indeed,

a

survey determined that

that one-half of recent clinic patients had had no previous

medical contact of any kind.

Despite these facts, few

physicians or administrators took the departments seriously
and at decade's end, ambulatory services still lacked

departmental status and continued as an adjunct to other
departments.

Efforts to persuade major departments to
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Shoulder more responsibility for
these services met with
resounding failure through the decade.
[15]

For concerned physicians, the
emergency ward was a
particular blight on the hospital.
According to one
concerned physician, instead of being
operated by
physicians "intimately familiar with and
concerned for and
understanding of the medical, social, and
economic problems
involved," the emergency ward was a place
older physicians
spent "their golden years quietly, with
hours and times
they deem necessary, with no standard
operating procedures,
or operating manual or fee standard or new
innovations, or

effort to add other physicians." No matter;
administrators
and senior medical staff were not overly concerned.
[16]

Some medical staff members tried to buck the

prevailing priorities of medical practice then current at
Springfield.

In 1969,

for example, a leader in the

pediatric department while stating his choice for the new
director of the department called for upgrading and giving

priority to ambulatory services "As we are
hospital, we

a

community

require an individual who is interested in

diverse aspects
superspecialist.

of pediatric care
"

[

— and

not a

17]

While primary care advocates had occasional victories,

most were relegated to second class status at Springfield.
There was, for example, little room for general

practitioners

— literally.

They were generally excluded
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from hospital privileges in the
early sixties.
Later, they
were allowed to have "some role"
but this was left
undefined and they had no discernible
influence on policy
making.
1971, some residents tried to enhance
the role
of primary care by calling for
a family residency program.
Their request was rebuffed; senior
staff explained that
Springfield lacked enough general practitioners
on staff
(no surprise since they had been
made unwelcome for the
previous decade) and did not have "sufficient
facilities"
for the practice of community medicine.
In 1974, another
call was made for a family practice department.
The

m

Physician-In-Chief brushed aside this request as well,
stating that Springfield had many other more important
priorities. [18]
The Joint Conference Committee and numerous advisory

boards tried without success to bridge the differences

between medical center supporters and those who wanted

Springfield to remain a community hospital.

Unable to

agree on Springfield's priorities or purposes or long-term
plans, Committee members stuck to bromides about the

importance of education, of better medical care, of the

value of new services, and so on. Such palaver deepened
physicians' sense of frustration about Springfield's

current state. [19]
By 1972 the Joint Conference Committee was practically

moribund, its members still unable
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— after

years of

meetings— to agree on Springfield's basic goals or
philosophy, and admitting that, given the
divisions among
Committee members, it was "difficult to draw firm

conclusions on the future of the Springfield Hospital

Medical Center. "[20]
Many Springfield personnel believed that growth could
solve many of the problems facing the hospital, that with

sufficient monies there would be room for all services and
programs.

The problem as in years past was that the state

and federal government grew less and less able or willing
to subsidize Springfield's endless expansion; it

consistently underpaid Springfield's total costs and paid
late at that.

Springfield went to court to recoup

government debts dating back in some instances nearly ten
years.

By the end of the sixties, Springfield was "losing"

one-half million dollars

a

year on medicare rates alone and

thousands more on welfare reimbursements which led them to
sharply raise rates for their other patients adversely

affecting public support for hospital projects.

Hospital

officials realized they could not long continue in such
circumstances.

Due to the cash shortage, administrators

postponed buying equipment, scaled back various projects,
floated bonds to raise monies for some programs, and

finally met with the governor to plead Springfield's case
for more funds. [21]
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—
,

Physicians and administrators alike had assumed
that
operating revenues would take care of all expansion

needs.

However, by the end of the decade, with severe
revenue

shortfalls, this was no longer possible; as was the
case in
the late fifties, each department turned against
the rest,
all clamoring for their rightful share.

Surgeons described

their demands as "musts... we are already too far behind."

Pathologists said that their facilities were taxed to the
limit; others spoke of shortages as nearing the danger

point and of staff turnover as vaulting to fifty percent a
year.

Each department trooped forth to board meetings

hat-in-hand

— to

explain their duties and acomplishments

and to press for their needs. [22]

Competition was particularly ferocious over bed
allocation.

The Medical Department Chair in 1969 described

the existing arrangement as "disgraceful," charging that

patients were being admitted to the emergency ward who
should not have been "on the whim of the doctor or social
status of the patient and not on the diagnosis or severity
of illness and needs of the institution," while other

patients were discharged who were not fit to leave. [23]
By the end of the sixties, Springfield was once again

coming apart.

Conditions were again unsafe or

unacceptable, the staff again poorly trained, overworked,
and unable to provide timely or basic care to patients, and

equipment again constantly breaking down.
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In surveys,

patients expressed ais.ay at
Springf ieia-s dis.al state
and
dissatisfaction with their
medical care. [24]
Springfield's difficulties in
the early seventies were
compounded by actions of the
local Planning Council.
The
building spree of Springfield
and other hospitals had
caused increasing consternation
of local businessmen and
politicians and even of some
physicians, all of whom

clamored for cost-cutting.

Their views dovetailed with

public opinion in Springfield
and nationally and also
reflected an important shift in
government health care
policy.
For all their achievements,
Medicare and Medicaid had
also created havoc within the
health care system, with no
effort to monitor hospital or
physician charges, the
programs issued, in effect, a blank
check to providers and
consumers alike igniting steep hikes in
health care costs;
with provisions for paym.ent for
construction and new
services as part of their charges, the
programs accelerated
the purchase of high cost and low utilization
equipment;

with inadequate coverage and lower payments for
primary,
preventative, and chronic care, the programs helped

strenthen a Medical Center model of health care at the
expense of meeting basic community services. [25]
The continuing problems of access, quality, and costs

created disillusionment about the efficacy of government
efforts to improve health care and led many to wonder if
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the country could afford the expense of
providing health
care to its citizens. While the U.S. health
care system
seemed to careen out of control, other western
industrial
countries had controlled costs and provided more
health

care coverage through tighter government oversight
of the
system.
The U.S., in the early seventies, began to do
likewise. [26]

The federal and state governments which had earlier

stressed minimal interference in the workings of the health
care system proceeded to severely clamp down on health care

providers and consumers.

It raised eligibility

requirements, reduced coverage, and increased deductibles
for Medicare and Medicaid (in the process formally

abandoning the goal, oft stated since the mid-sixties, of
offering all Americans comprehensive health care)

.

It cut

reimbursements for both doctors and hospitals; it
instituted tighter surveillance of doctors' services, of

patient admissions, of patients' length of stay, and of
their treatment.

State agencies were given the power to

approve (or reject) hospital expansion projects or major
purchases.

Federal agencies were given the power to deny

Medicare or Medicaid funding to hospital plans that failed
to win state approval. [27]

Before the early seventies, the Planning Council, like
its

2

00 plus counterparts across the country, had let each

hospital go its own way regarding planning.
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It had served

simply as an advisory body without any
clear plan how to
structure the area's health care system, and
had no means
to implement its very limited proposals
or to enforce its
occasional recommendations. However, thanks to
increased
federal funding the Council ceased to be the
creature of
the local hospital establishment.

Moreover, federal

legislation mandating representation of consumer interests
on Council Boards resulted in a more interventionist

Council.

The Council tried to improve area health care

delivery by insisting on increased primary care services.

And having gained the power to deny hospitals government
reimbursement it finally had the clout neccessary to begin
to reshape the health care system.
The Council restricted or rejected what it viewed as

unnecessary, inappropriate, or prohibitively expensive

hospital projects.

In 1971,

for the first time ever, the

Council insisted that Springfield reduce the scope and cost
of its current expansion program.

Even more distressing to

hospital officials. Council investigators demanded to know,
also for the first time, just how Springfield's plans fit
in with those of the city's other major hospital

—Wesson

Memorial. [28]

Compared to Springfield, Wesson had always had a more
"low tech" primary care approach.

Established as a

homeopathic institution in 1906 nearly 20 years after
Springfield's founding, Wesson Memorial never had had the
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financial resources or
inclination to match Springfield's
facilities.
wesson's bread and butter
was routine medical
and surgical care: broken
bones, hysterectomies,
gall
bladder surgery, and the
like.
The hospital had fewer
specialists, fewer beds, and
a smaller staff than
Springfield and virtually no
educational program in the
sixties and seventies. For all
these reasons, Wesson's
operating budget was much smaller
than Springfield's and
its income more closely matched
its expenses.
Community
fund drives were usually sufficient
to make up deficits and
Wesson's expansion was usually for
the purpose of

establishing more bed space rather
than to purchase
expensive equipment.
Wesson's doctors had their own brand of

professionalism that emphasized patient
contact over
research, and eschewed the sort of
fragmented medical care
so prevalent at Springfield and other
hospitals throughout
the country. Wesson largely ceded the field
to Springfield
for the most advanced acute care; and where
special
services were concerned Wesson concentrated on
ambulatory
care such as the emergency ward, and the orthopedics
and

rehabilitation departments. [29]
In some respects. Wesson was more successful than

Springfield.

With a far more homogenous staff than

Springfield, Wesson's physicians had fewer conflicts with
one another.

Moreover, the staff's values more closely
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paralelled Wesson's day to day operations and so
there was
fewer conflict between physicians and administrators.
Most
importantly, Wesson better met the basic health
needs
of

Springfield's residents and as

a

result enjoyed a better

public image, and more community support for its expansion
plans

While Springfield was mired in severe problems.

Wesson's popularity was such through this period that it
became a direct threat to Springfield for patient dollars
and public support.

However, Wesson's decision to

aggressively poach on what had been Springfield's turf was
also due to financial pressures.

In general. Wesson had

enjoyed greater financial stability than Springfield

through much of the sixties.

However, it too relied more

and more on Medicaid and Medicare as a principal source of
income; it too suffered from what it felt was measly

compensation and tardy payments from government agencies
for indigent and elderly patients.

Revenue shortfalls

finally caused Wesson to modify its emphasis on primary
care in favor of specialty services which offered the

promise of higher reimbursables from both government
programs and private insurance plans. [30]

Wesson and Springfield furiously competed with one
another for state and private backing for their respective
programs.

Wesson, for example, much to Springfield's

alarm, nominated itself as the region's heart, cancer, and
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stroke center under the auspices of the federal
government.

Springfield derided Wesson's proposal, asserting that

Wesson's staff was not up to the job, and argued that
Wesson's real aim was to help boost her building program
and get increased funding and public support.

There was

likely much truth to Springfield's claim but the same could
well have been said of Springfield itself during this
period.

The Council counseled that the two institutions

plan and apply together for the program.

Springfield

officials were queasy though about working with Wesson,

worried that cooperation might give the upstart more credit
than they deserved and raise Wesson's image even higher in
the public eye at Springfield's expense.

However,

Springfield leaders feared that if they did not join with
Wesson, Wesson might accrue all the credit to itself.

The

result seems to have been luke warm participation in
Springfield's cooperation regarding
Program.

a

Regional Medical

For both hospitals, cooperation was a matter of

convenience not of conviction and had no apparent impact at
the time on either hospital's building or expansion plans.
In 1970, the state Department Of Public Health named

Wesson as Western Massachusett's radiotheraphy center.
Outraged Springfield officials sputtered that Wesson had no
expertise in the field but could do nothing to reverse the
decision.

When Wesson later decided to order a new piece

of expensive equipment, a cobalt 60 unit, Springfield
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officials sharply criticized Wesson for fixating
on one
particular tool in the arsenal of anti-cancer agents.
Still, Springfield doctors did refer patients
to Wesson for

use of that equipment and Springfield obtained one

themselves just as soon as they could.

Whatever its

economy or praticality, keeping up with the jones was
essential
Physicians of each institution were in the vanguard of
the inter-hospital contest to the chagrin of neutral

observers like Dr.

John Ayres, Director of the city's

small chronic care hospital, and a leader of the district

medical society.

"Each hospital medical staff," he said,

"zealously guards, support, and seeks to enlarge its own
privileges, prerogatives, and status... for its mother
institution.

Can sectarianism which is prevalent

throughout entire hospital programs be overcome? .... Can the
staff of separate hospitals be drawn together for the

common good?" He thought not, and warned Springfield's and

Wesson's partisans "medical planning will continue to be
done by non-medical groups and rightly so long as we remain

divided and fractionated.

"

[31]

Writing in the district medical society bulletin,

physicians urged that the two institutions unite to fight
against cancer and endorsed regional hospital planning to
this end.

They encouraged Wesson and Springfield to form

an oncology group for joint purchases to "reveal to
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accusers and friends that doctors
are interested in
patients and community welfare."
Neither hospital seriously
considered their proposal,
1971, Springfield officials
were hopeful the Council would
approve their contruction

m

projects over Wesson's, convinced
that Wesson was
duplicating their own programs and
were in any event
inferior.
They were stunned when word came
from the
Planning Council that Springfield's
proposed additions were
deemed too expensive, unnecessary, and
economically
wasteful.
The Council ordered Springfield to
resubmit its
plans and to redesign the project, causing
Springfield to
drastically scale down its expansion plans.
Springfield no
longer could freely expand its facilities
hamstrung by the

planning council, and Wesson's opposition.
[32]
In 1973, the Planning Council continued pushing
the

two hospitals to work together, and tried to get
them to

merge their cancer programs without much success.

In 1974

the two did begin to create a tumor registry, and

collaborated on some educational ventures, but that was the
extent of their coooperation.

There was no accommodation

between the two where construction, equipment, and

personnel were concerned. [33]
In 1974, both hospitals wanted expensive new cancer

treatment equipment.

The Council declared that for either

to do so, they would have to increase cooperation in cancer

management.

The two hospitals duly fashioned a new
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committee composed of Jimmy Fund
executives, trustees,
physicians, administrators, officials
of Monarch Life
insurance Company and others. But
cooperation along the
lines of joint services and
planning never materialized.
Each hospital was determined to
go its own way and not be
bound by any outside committee.
Springfield, for its part,

launched a public relations campaign
highlighting its
medical center stature and arguing
that it, and it alone,
should rightfully acquire the equipment
.[ 34

Neither Springfield's nor Wesson's medical
staff could
rectify the multiple problems facing the
two hospitals,
in
1974, an editorial writer in the district
medical society

journal reported that the Planning Council
had discovered a
pattern of excess, a duplication of efforts, and
a

deficiency in both hospitals' personnel and functioning.
He argued that these might be addressed if
physicians were

more involved and cooperative.

Unfortunately, he

explained, local physicians were too divided within their
own medical staffs

across town

— to

not to mention with their rivals

tackle the problems facing the two

institutions. [35]
The conflict between Wesson and Springfield culminated
in early 1975 when both filed proposals with the Planning

Council to purchase cobalt 60 machines at a cost of one

million dollars each, and presented competing construction
plans totalling close to forty million dollars.
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Springfield leaders feared that,
"the public will not stand
for two competing proposals,
each appearing to be
identical." And indeed that
was the Council^s reaction.
Springfield's plans were blocked
by Wesson's
own bid. [36]

Springfield's problems were compounded
by extreme
financial problems. For more than
three years, its general
surplus had been swallowed up by
shortfalls.
The major
culprit was Medicaid and Medicare
whose debts jumped from
two million in 1973 to close to
ten million
in 1975. [37]

The winter of 1975 was comparable
to the financial
emergency of fifteen years earlier;
trustees again
anxiously pored over the figures on accounts
receivable.
By spring, debts were increasing at a
rate of two hundred
thousand dollars a month, and three million
six hundred
thousand dollars had been borrowed to keep
Springfield

functioning.

Furthermore, Springfield officials worried

that the four million five hundred thousand dollars
owed by
Medicare might never be paid, and they were also informed
that the state had ordered a freeze on increases for

hospital rates. [38]
Springfield

officials fired off a letter to state

legislators, explaining that the institution could not

operate without financial stability, that freezing one
sector of the health care field was simplistic and
counterproductive.

They warned that to do so would cause
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Springfield to delay or cancel the
repair and replacement
of needed equipment, and cancel
crucial projects.
Hospital officials urged the state
to shoulder its rightful
share of the burden of health care
costs by paying its back
debts and henceforth providing
reasonable renumeration
for

hospital services,

state officials ignored Springfield's

appeals. [39]
By the spring of 1975, Springfield was
close to
running out of funds. The freeze on charges
made it

impossible to raise operating revenue; deficits
continued
to mount and worsened that summer, triggering
severe cuts
in hospital services.
In July,
Springfield and Wesson

trustees conferred in hopes of reducing the antagonism
between the two institutions.

A few weeks later, following

secret trustee negotiations, Springfield's Executive

Director Harry Gifford was informed during a round of golf
that Wesson and Springfield would soon merge.
The decision to merge the institutions was a bold
step.

It was an attempt by local business and political

leaders to impose greater order and planning on the area's

health care system.

They hoped that the merger would

result in greater economies, in improved services, in

better patient care, in easier access to government monies,
and in the reduction of unnecessary construction. [40]
The merger creating the Baystate Medical Center stirred

considerable opposition from physicians from the former
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Medical center of Western Massachusetts
and from Wesson
Memorial Hospital. Partly, this stemmed
from the outrage of
medical staff towards trustees who had
unilaterally decided
something of great consequence to local
physicians. The
trustee's actions reenforced physicians' general
belief that
they were no longer in control of their destiny,
that their
views no longer determined hospital affairs. Moreover,

physicians were dismayed and outraged that the trustees
could in almost cavalier fashion join together two hospitals

with vastly different resources, operations, medical
cultures, priorities, facilities, and bylaws and that had

competed with one another in

a

variety of services and

programs

Meshing the two institutions was
lengthy task.

a

formidable and

Many Wesson staff felt that their smaller

community hospital was being cannibalized by the larger
richer neighbor, and that the lion's share of the new

hospital's budget would go to provide the most sophisticated

technology at the expense of community needs.

For their

part, many from the former Medical Center of Western

Massachusetts felt that their hospital would deteriorate in
quality by incorporating Wesson Memorial whose medical staff
and facilties they found inferior.

A series of task forces were created which then met
regularly from 1976 to 1979 yet were unable to agree on
clear set of policies.

An outside consultant was then
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called in to try to recommend
solutions to the many problems
bedeviling the institution-many
of which had earlier
divided Springfield twenty years
before when a consultant
had been previously hired. The
existing conflicts between a
community hospital orientation
and a medical center
approach, between private practitioners
and salaried
personnel, between specialists and
primary care physicians,
and between specialists were now
joined by the clash

between two different medical staffs.
The combined medical staff fought among
themselves for
control of Baystate's resources. The
medical staff fought
over whether there should remain two
separate hospital
facilities and whether specific services should
be

integrated at one or the other institution.

The

administration and trustees having no overall plan only
added to the frustration and low morale of physicians.
In the late

7 0s,

continuing government reductions in

payments for Medicare and Medicaid patients compounded

Baystate's problems.

This caused a surge of debt that

increased by sixty percent in a few years and led to

growing deficit for five years,

a

in response, Baystate

increased its rates yearly from thirteen to more than twenty
two percent, about double the national yearly rate of
inflation, which was passed onto private insurers and their

customers in the form of higher premiums.
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Such financal

problems forced Baystate to raid
its endowment and
depreciation funds for operating
revenue.

In 1980, Baystate was not
demonstrably better off than
five years earlier,
fact, the hospital was suffering

m

physician defections to other local
hospitals, and was
plagued by deficiencies in patient
care, its medical
programs frozen because of problems of
finance
and

administration.
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CHAPTER

6

CONCLUSION

Twentieth century private hospitals are
usually
depicted as gleaming palaces of medical
science that
emphasized specialty care and technical
services to the
middle classes who mostly populated them.
Charity patients
were but a small factor in their operations;
Government
monies, aside from occasional subsidies— notably
provided

by the Hill-Burton Congressional Act in the
1940s and

Medicare in the 1960s— were not much of a factor in private
hospitals' development. Such hospitals generally operated
on a stable financial footing which enabled them to enjoy

steady and mostly painless expansion of their physical

plant and programs and personnel.

physicians

— consumate

The staffs of up-to-date

professionals

tightly knit medical community.

— together

formed a

The staff's behavior and

beliefs closely paralelled that of their representative
national professional bodies

— particularly

the AMA.

Hospital physicians had a generally amicable partnership

with administrators.

And administrators and physicians

alike enjoyed tight ties to the surrounding community in
the form of ample contributions and widespread volunteer
aid.

Springfield's history provides a startling counter

example to the usual story of private hospitals.

Springfield was a surprisingly grubby, chaotic, and
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—
contentious institution throughout its
history.
Physicians
especially were torn by personnel rivalries,
town-gown
conflicts, ethnic hostility, antagonisms
between
specialists and generalists, and they fought
nearly
continuously with administrators, trustees, and
outsiders.

Professionalism of physicians as demonstrated by
community service— namely through attending to
Springfield's poorer patients— was sorely lacking

throughout Springfield's history.

Professionalism as shown

by physician self-regulation to ensure high quality medical

practice also came remarkably late to Springfield.

In

general, professionalism meant one thing above all

autonomy

— and

autonomy enabled many physicians to evade

their responsibilities to provide the best care to patients
and to generally improve the hospital.

There was an enormous gap between the standards of

modern medicine and the actual norms and practice of many
local physicians.

The vaunted AMA and other kindred groups

generally did not have much impact in the day to day
affairs of Springfield for most of its history.

Moreover,

numerous edicts from professional groups were widely
ignored until the late 1950s.

When Springfield's

physicians finally did consent to broader standards, and
relinquished some measure of autonomy, they did so not from
some internalized sense of professional propriety but

because their continued affiliation with Springfield
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Hospital was at stake.

Their hospital privileges were
jeopardized by the forceful actions
of outside regulators
like government bodies,
accrediting organizations, and
national professional groups.

Caring for charity patients was
central and not
tangential to Springfield's history.
The numbers of those
seeking treatment without the means
to pay was a major
factor causing crowding and deterioration
of Springfield's
services.

The surge of charity patients
necessitated
Springfield's expansion while the deficits
caused by
uncompensated care made it difficult to do
so,
all made
long term planning nearly impossible.
Government aid for
the poor was both bane and boon to
Springfield—boon

because it provided something in the way of
payment for the
poor but also bane because more often than not,
such

payments failed to cover the actual costs of care,

contributing to chronic fiscal instabilities.
Springfield faced perennial problems because of its

unsteady mix of public and private revenues.

A large

portion of its patient base could not afford medical care.
The number of patients varied depending on the state of the
local economy, the availability of reasonably priced
insurance, the demographics of the area, the range of

diseases prevalent and the expense of Springfield's
services.

All told, at any given time, perhaps

thirty

percent of patients were not paying their full cost of
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care.

The dilemma facing Springfield Hospital
throughout
its history was how to balance the
hospital's bottom line
considerations with the needs of charity patients.
Many
charity patients either did not get care or
got it

belatedly, or had to employ cajolery or subterfuge
to get
treated. When they received care, it tended to be
of a

lower quality than that received by private patients.

Pressure from charity patients and their advocates

prevented their being turned away altogether. However, the
medical treatment they received was of lower quality than
that obtained by paying patients.

While charity care did

improve as it did for all patients, and charity care

gradually more closely approximated that received by the
well to do, provision for proper health care for charity

patients was granted only grudgingly throughout this
period
Some non-medical personnel like social workers,

volunteers, representatives of charitable groups, along

with long-time outsiders like junior medical staff,
outpatient staff, and Jewish physicians, did have a broader

view of appropriate medical care and the responsibilites of

physicians to the larger community.

However, their

proposals were blocked for years and sometimes even
decades.

Reformers at Springfield

were stymied until they

gained the support of outside professional and governmental
agencies, until the broader medical culture favored their
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views, or until there was widespread feeling
in the

community that the hospital was in a crisis that
demanded
immediate action.
Charity care taxed and destabilized Springfield

Hospital in a variety of ways.

Private patients paid more

for their charges or insurance premiums to cover some

portion of the costs of charity patients.

When monies were

available for expansion, hospital priorities— namely the
search for maximium revenues

— dictated

that Springfield

concentrate on specialized in-patient services for private
patients.

Emphasizing these services helped spur

Springfield's development into a major medical center and
also led administrators and physicians to neglect important

health care problems facing Springfield's citizens
especially those having to do with primary and chronic
care.

Springfield's transformation into

a

medical center was

its most ambitious effort to grow itself out of its

problems

— financial

difficulties above all.

The problem it

faced in the 70s was that government, employers, and

insurers were increasingly resistant to paying for the

higher costs associated with open ended growth.
Springfield Hospital strained for nearly a century to

deliver high quality care to all at an affordable cost.
The difficulties Springfield and other private hospitals

experienced in trying to do so were the natural result of a
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seriously flawed health care system,

characterized by the

autonomy of doctors, a fee for service
payment system,
thousands of individual institutions competing
for their
share of the health care market, the existance
of a

large

number of persons unable to pay for their own
care, efforts
at cost shifting between hospitals and
government
agencies,

from employers to insurers to patients, and the absence
of

significant social planning of hospital priorities.
(Baystate Medical Ce nter HMO studv Committee Final
Report November 20, 1980).

"The question of HMOs... in many ways represents the
core of many of our current healthcare questions.
Cost is a major factor in today's healthcare world,
and HMOs represent a significant possibility ... for
containment.
Competition is a key word in today's
healthcare world and HMOs represent competition
not only to each other and to traditional insurance
plans but to the very heart of the life flow of most
hospitals their inpatient days. The questions of
regulatory control and depth of government involvement
in the health care arena in many ways focus on HMOs...
with some saying that HMOs represent the last
opportunities for the health care field to develop
programs outside direct government control."

—

Medical historians have seriously misread the history
of hospitals in the twentieth century.

Partly as a result,

they have been caught flatfooted when it comes to

discussing contemporary developments.

Who among them

writing in the 1980s anticipated the explosive rise of
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs)? Wedded to the
notion that the US health care system was a johnny-comelately to a "normal" health care system, ie. one with

overarching government involvement
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either foresaw

growing government regulation
or else expected that
hospitals and physicians would
join forces and embark on
all sorts of novel proft-making
ventures-f rom chains of
emergicenters to dialysis facilities,
but that otherwise
the system would pretty much
straggle along as it
had.

With a reflexive skepticism about
the ability of the market
to meet America's health care
needs,
none of them
anticipated the enormous growth of
hybrid health care
organizations combining financing and the
delivery of
health services. Because they overestimated
the strength
of doctors and hospitals through the
century, they assumed
that these providers would torpedo efforts
at meaningful
reform. Medical historians writing in the
1980s recognized
that the era of government and private insurers
funding
massive expansion of hospitals— funding which
had also

sustained providers' power— had passed. Yet, none
of them

anticipated that large employers and insurers and
government would, by creating and supporting HMOs, utterly
usurp providers' dominance in healthcare. HMOs have begun
to dethrone the medical center model emphasizing acute

inpatient care in favor of primary and preventative
services.

Furthermore, by installing primary care

physicians as a major gatekeeper for patient services, HMOs
have begun to restore primary care physicians to the center
of medical practice.
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It could well be argued
that HMO's are a much
needed
improvement on the existing
system bringing some measure
of

rationality and order to healthcare.

Certainly,

Springfield's experience suggests
that individual hospitals
or even hospitals as a group
would not change much without
being forced to as the result
of powerful outside
organizations like HMOs.

And while available records for

the period since 1980 are scanty
and sketchy, they do
indicate that Baystate Medical Center
made an early and
significant accommodation to HMOs.
Baystate wisely chose
to market itself to HMOs and reshaped
its services to some
extent to gain HMO support and customers.
By doing
so,

Baystate expanded and diversified its facilities
which made
it more financially solvent, partly by
reducing inpatient
costs and partly by securing a steady stream
of private
patients to offset the large numbers of charity
patients.

Though Baystate 's experience suggests that HMOs
might
be good for individual hospitals, it remains to
be seen

whether the current system of managed care under HMOs can
adequately reconstruct the nation's healthcare system.

As

Theodore Marmor in Understanding Health Care Reform, Philip
Lee in The Nation's Health, Eli Ginzberg in Critical Tssnpg
In U.S. Health RgfgrJD and others point out, HMOs success is

predicated on physician's compliance with cost control
incentives.

It is not at all clear whether physicians

might evade these, or assuming that physicians comply.
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Whether doing so

win

lead to not just a reduction
in costs
but in the quality of care,
or whether the cost
of

micromanagement will undermine
savings to the system as a
Whole.
The sort of rule making
characteristic of HMOs is
unheard of in those countries
where global budgets for
operating and capital expenditures
determine allocations of
hospital programs, and services are
determined at the
provincial or federal level, what's more,
quality in such
regimes seems to be on par with our own.
But in lieu of
such a system being established here,
perhaps this sort of
rule making is a necessary step especially
given American
physicians well deserved reputation for
technological

imperatives.

Lastly, and most importantly,

even if costs

are reduced, there is no guarantee that the
savings will be
used to ensure expanded access to care for the
millions

presently without it or to ensure that that their care
is
adequate
Just as the specialized medical center model seemed

invincible and permanent, yet lasted just a brief span of
time, so it is unlikely that HMOs in their current

incarnation will be the last reform of the healthcare
system.

It may be that the public's opposition to

increased taxes or another big government program might be

reduced if citizens lose heart in HMOs.

It may be that

physicians who have always seen big government as their
151

biggest bugaboo will turn against
HMOs for reducing their
salaries, depriving them of
decision-making powers, adding
to their paperwork, and
making them employees of large
corporations. Clearly, the reshaping
of the healthcare
system will preoccupy physicians,
policy-makers and
ordinary citizens for years to come.
,
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A.

THE GROWTH OF SPRINGFIELD HOSPITAL

PATIENTS
ADMITTED

EMPLOYEES

PHYSICIANS

1890

163

8

13

1900

487

18

24

1910

2,150

55

37

1920

3,911

99

50

1930

4,583

128

107

1940

6,270

156

122

1950

8, 357

305

146

898

207

X

iiAK

1960

13

,

000

1970

13

,

100

1980

39,700

2,

000

3,800

154

450
1,

000

i

,,

DEVELOPMENT OF SPRINGFIELD
HOSPITALS

YEAR
1889
1898

NAME

Springfield

Mercy

TYPE

non-denominational
private
Catholic,
private

FOPTTQ

general
inedical cp^t^

general
inedical care

1906

Wesson
Maternity

non-denominational
private

obstetrics

1906

Wesson
Memorial

non-demoninationa
private

general

Springfield
Municipal

public

1948
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inedical care

chronic
illness &
elderly care
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